Strategic Interaction, Competition, Cooperation and Observability by Groh, Christian
Strategic Interaction, Competition,
Cooperation and Observability
Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
an der Universita¨t Mannheim
Christian Groh
vorgelegt im Sommersemester 2001
Referent Prof. Martin Hellwig, PhD
Korreferent Prof. Dr. Benny Moldovanu
Dekan Prof. Dr. Christoph Buchheim
Tag der mu¨ndlichen Pru¨fung 20. November 2001
Acknowledgements
My deepest thanks and gratitude go to my thesis supervisor, Martin Hellwig. Our
discussions during many hours in his office shaped and reshaped my view on economics.
I was always impressed by his constructive openness to the various unorganized ideas
I came up with. During my first year as a PhD student I also learnt a lot from his
excellent teaching. I still consult my notes from these lectures quite often...
I also thank Benny Moldovanu for his detailed comments on chapter three and
chapter four and for agreeing to be my second examiner. Tilman Bo¨rgers was my
supervisor when I visited UCL in London within ENTER. He took lots of time for me
during my stay in London. Chapter three originated from his thoughts.
I’d like to thank my friends and colleagues for many excellent and cheerful discus-
sions on the topics of this dissertation: Malte Cherdron, Heiko Gerlach, Roman Inderst
and Dezso¨ Szalay. I am honestly happy to have them and all the other former and
present members of the Graduiertenkolleg Allokation auf Finanz- und Gu¨terma¨rkten
as colleagues in a stimulating atmosphere.
Financial Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Schwa¨bisch
Hall Bausparkasse is gratefully acknowledged.
4
Contents
1 Introduction 9
1.1 Sequential Moves and Comparative Statics in Strategic Market Games . 11
1.2 The Effects of Competition on Bargaining Power in Repeated Bilateral
Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3 Communication Networks and Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2 Sequential Moves and Comparative Statics in Strategic Market Games
21
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 Comparative Statics and Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.1 Simultaneous Moves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.2 Sequential Moves: The Sellers as First-Movers . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.3 Sequential Moves: The Buyers as First-Movers . . . . . . . . . 31
5
2.3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4 Stable Trading Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5 Elimination of the No-Trade Equilibrium and Walrasian Convergence . 37
2.6 Existence of a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3 The Effects of Competition on Bargaining Power in Repeated Bilat-
eral Negotiations 43
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 Powerful Buyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3 Disadvantageous Outside Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 The Effect of Buyer Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5 Relation to the Bargaining Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4 Communication Networks and Cooperation 75
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3 Equilibrium and Choice of Contacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3.1 Cooperation without Institutions ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6
4.4 Noisy Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.4.1 Noise and Equilibrium Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.4.2 Analysis of Equilibria with Noisy Communication . . . . . . . . 92
4.5 Gossip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A Appendix to Chapter 2 (The Proof of Proposition 2) 111
B Appendix to Chapter 3 (The Proof of Proposition 6) 117
7
8
Chapter 1
Introduction
The early oligopoly studies by Cournot [13] and Bertrand [8] have shaped
economists’ thinking using game theoretic methods before the invention of game theory.
Nowadays, the standard textbook Cournot model and Bertrand model continue to
influence the way economists think of various aspects of market power. Among others,
these are phenomena such as cartel formation and implicit collusion or the influence of
the number of sellers on the distribution of surplus.
Both the Cournot model and the Bertrand model make important distinctions
between buyers and sellers. Sellers are able to influence prices and move first. They
choose prices or quantities anticipating the non-strategic reaction of the buyers. The
buyers are just represented by a demand function (i.e. act passively) and move second.
Given the sellers’ choices of quantities or prices, the demand function provides market
clearing. This asymmetry in behavior is different from General Equilibrium Theory
which treats buyers and sellers symmetrically. There, all agents behave as price takers
and make their decisions simultaneously. Since sellers are modelled as strategic players,
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the Cournot model and the Bertrand model allow to discuss phenomena which can
not be analyzed in General Equilibrium Theory: for example, the models provide a
framework to study cartel formation and implicit collusion. Due to the asymmetry
between buyers and sellers these aspects can be discussed only for the sellers. In
addition, they can be studied only under the restriction that the other side of the
market, the buyers, behaves non-strategically. In other words: certain roles which
agents might play in a given market are fixed exogenously. In a Cournot model, only
sellers can develop patterns of implicit collusion sustained by price wars, as modelled
with the aid of the theory of infinitely repeated games (Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti
[2]).
The exogenous fixation of roles causes the following difficulty. In the end, we
do observe markets in which buyers do not act passively. Many intermediate goods
markets today are characterized by market power on both the seller and the buyer side.
For example, markets for retailing tend to involve significant market power of retail
chains. The power of such chains is a matter of serious policy concern (see Dobson
and Waterson [17] and [18]). As a result both producers as sellers and retail chains as
buyers exercise market power. Hence theoretic considerations of collusive behavior in
such a market should not be based on the textbook story of tit-for-tat in a repeated
Cournot oligopoly model. This being said, how robust are our insights on collusion in
a framework where sellers and buyers are symmetric?
The present dissertation looks at situations without distinctions between buyers
and sellers and discusses these issues in three distinct settings. In all settings all eco-
nomic agents act strategically. Chapter 2 considers a strategic market game model
as originally developed by Shapley and Shubik [52]. I analyze how the distribution
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of surplus in the market depends on the number of buyers and sellers under different
timing structures. Chapter 3 studies patterns of cooperation and collusion in a model
of decentralized trading where prices are determined by repeated bilateral negotiations.
Chapter 4 considers the functioning of information networks intended to sustain coop-
eration in a Prisoner’s Dilemma with changing partners. As we shall see, the results
depend on assumptions on the mechanism of price formation (central exchange versus
decentralized negotiations), the timing (one-shot game versus infinitely repeated game)
and the observability of moves (perfect information versus imperfect information).
In the remainder of this introduction I discuss the motivation for these papers
and their main contributions in more detail.
1.1 Sequential Moves and Comparative Statics in
Strategic Market Games
In a recent paper, Bloch and Ghosal [10] study the formation of trading groups in a
bilateral oligopoly. Their model of bilateral oligopoly is based on a strategic market
game model a` la Shapley and Shubik [52]. Strategic market games model strategic
exchange economies as noncooperative simultaneous moves games. Traders send si-
multaneously bids and supplies of goods to the market mechanism. The goods’ prices
are determined by the ratio of bids and supplies for a good. A strategic market game
models a market with market power on both sides and a centralized exchange and price
formation mechanism. It is a spot market organized as an exchange where each trader
obtains a share of the total bids from the other side of the market which is proportional
to his share of the total bids from his side of the market. Strategic market games are
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deemed to be an advantage over Cournot oligopolies since all agents act strategically.
Bloch and Ghosal find that the only strongly stable trading group is the grand
coalition where all agents trade on the same market. A trading group is strongly stable
if no coalition of traders can deviate such that all of its members obtain at least as high
as a utility as before and some members obtain a strictly higher utility. The incentives
to form trading groups are derived from two comparative statics results on the Nash
equilibrium of the noncooperative model of exchange. First, traders on one side of the
market always benefit from an increase in the number of traders on the other side of
the market. Second, on any symmetric market, where the number of traders of the two
types is equal, the traders’ utilities increase with the size of the market. Third, Bloch
and Ghosal find that (p.375)
...one of the most intuitive results obtained in partial equilibrium oligopoly
analysis does not carry over to the case of bilateral oligopoly. In the classical
Cournot oligopoly, as the number of firms increases, the profit of each firm
is reduced. In the context of bilateral oligopoly, an increase in the number
of traders of one type may induce either positive or adverse effects on the
traders of this type...
These findings give rise to two problems: first, one has the feeling that in such
centralized exchange markets traders would not benefit from more competition. More-
over, not all traders trade on the same market in such markets, i.e. there exist different
exchanges where a good can be traded.
We know from Cournot oligopoly theory that, as the number of firms increases,
the profit of each firm is reduced.
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Moreover, we know from the Cournot oligopoly model (Bloch and Ghosal, p.369)
...that traders have an incentive to set up distinct, separate markets on
which they behave as monopolists...
There are two differences between strategic market games and Cournot oligopoly
models. Strategic market game models exhibit strategic behavior from all traders and
simultaneity) of moves. I consider a sequential version of the Shapley-Shubik models
in which traders on one side of the market, the sellers, move first. The buyers observe
the sellers’ choices and move second. I discuss an example where sellers are risk-neutral
and buyers’ utility is quasilinear and quadratic. For the simultaneous moves game of
that setting, an increase in the number of sellers may have a positive effect on sellers’
utilities. Moreover, the only strongly stable trading structure is the one where all agents
trade on the same market. With sequential moves, the following results are obtained:
first, as the number of sellers increases, the profit of each seller is unambiguously
reduced. Second, on any symmetric market, an increase in the number of traders has
ambiguous effects on the sellers’ equilibrium utilities! This in turn implies that there
might exist strongly stable trading structures in which not all agents trade on the same
market.
The introduction of sequential moves has a further implication. In simultaneous
moves strategic market games there is always a no-trade equilibrium. The strategic
market games literature contains many results that predict Walrasian equilibria in the
competitive limit. However, they usually come at the expense of ad hoc assumptions
that rule out the pathological no trade equilibria. Weyers [56] studies a strategic mar-
ket game with limit prices to solve this problem.1 The set of Nash equilibria of this
1The limit price mechanism of Mertens [40] is a mechanism for determine prices and final allocation
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game converges to the set containing the competitive and the no-trade equilibrium,
when players are replicated. Two-rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated
strategies eliminate the no-trade equilibria. A sequential moves strategic market game
proposes another, simpler solution to this problem concerning the no-trade equilibrium.
In essence, traders face a coordination problem, where one equilibrium, the trade equi-
librium pareto-dominates the no-trade equilibrium. It is well known that in a 2-player
coordination game with sequential moves and perfect information the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Hence only the trade-
equilibrium emerges in my sequential strategic market game. I show for an example
that this unique subgame perfect equilibrium converges to the Walrasian equilibrium
as the market size goes out of bounds.
1.2 The Effects of Competition on Bargaining Power
in Repeated Bilateral Negotiations
”We have a saying at this company: our competitors are our friends and
our customers are our enemies...God damn buyers [are the enemy]. We’ve
gotta have them. But they are not my friends. You’re my friend. I want
to be closer to you than I am to any customer because you can make us
money.”
This quote is from a former executive of Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM), a lysine pro-
ducer. Lysine is a food additive designed to put additional meat on hogs. The quote
when agents trade a finite number of goods by placing an arbitrary number of market or limit orders.
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was recorded by an FBI mole. Largely on the basis of the audio- and videotapes he pro-
vided, a federal jury in Chicago convicted three former ADM executives in September
1998 of engaging in an international conspiracy to fix lysine prices.2
For any economist, the meaning of such a statement seems clear: competitors
are friends if they help to sustain collusive prices by reducing production. This is the
simple mechanism we know from the standard Cournot textbook model.
For most business-to-business goods, Cournot markets or markets similar to the
double auction-like scenario of chapter 2 are just the tiny tip of a huge market of
such one-to-one deals. Most business-to-business goods are traded through bilateral
contracts.3 That is, we have a situation of bilateral oligopoly with bilateral negotations;
both buyers and sellers exercise market power. Then matters are not all that obvious!
To see why consider a market with repeated bilateral negotiations, as modelled in
chapter 3. Sellers make all the offers and have zero value for the good, the buyers have
a commonly known value of one. Buyers can accept or reject an offer. Every trader
maximizes the sum of his discounted per-period utilities from transactions. Suppose
there is only one seller and only one buyer, the case of bilateral monopoly. The infinite
repetition of the stage game does not preclude the buyer from extracting all the surplus.
Threats to refuse any slightly unsatisfactory offer - even if this would be better than
not to buy at all - are credible if acceptance induces a reputation for softness and
implies worst equilibria in the rest of the relation. Hence, in a market where infinitely
repeated transactions take place in isolation, the presence of other buyers does not
matter for any individual buyer: there is an equilibrium in which the buyer extracts
the full surplus from the bargaining. The argument is based on the Folk Theorem of
2See http://www.wwnorton.com/mip/ime/varian/28b.htm for more.
3See The Economist [19].
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repeated game theory and does not rely on other buyers providing punishment through
price wars as in a Cournot oligopoly. It is hence not clear what the above quote - with
interchanged roles of buyers and sellers - means in such a world. I shall argue that
”competitors are friends” holds if there are outside options for the buyers in form of
alternative trading partners!
Suppose that there are alternative trading partners for each buyer, that is, a sce-
nario with increased seller competition. In contrast to economic intuition, the presence
of more sellers reduces a buyer’s surplus as compared to the bilateral monopoly situ-
ation. Outside options yield more benign equilibria than the worst equilibrium in the
continuation of the current relationship. The argument presumes that the alternative
trading partners have no information about a buyer’s trading history. Hence, they
cannot be integrated into a system of punishment strategies.
I then allow buyers to visit a seller who is currently matched to another buyer.
If this happens, the two buyers compete for the seller. Buyers’ competition mitigates
the negative effect of the outside option. In particular, competing buyers prevent each
other from achieving a favorable equilibrium in a new relation. In other words: the
profitability of the outside option is reduced through competition. This in turn yields
more severe punishments than in the case without competition. Then, a buyers payoff
in a situation with competition exceeds his payoff in the best equilibrium without
competition for any discount factor.
The main result of the chapter is that the presence of competitors may be useful
while the presence of more agents on the other side of the market is not. The effect
of competition to sustain favorable equilibria is well known from infinitely repeated
Cournot or Bertrand games. Chapter 3 shows that implicit collusion as suggested by
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these models also can be modeled in a market with bilateral negotiations. The role of
competition, however, is a different one. In the Cournot and in the Bertrand model,
competition on the same side of the market causes a problem in the first place. The
problem for any buyer in the model of chapter 3 is that competition on the other side of
the market reduces his surplus by introducing an outside option. Buyers’ competition
limits the value of the outside option for each buyer.
1.3 Communication Networks and Cooperation
The Walrasian theory of exchange is a theory of anonymous interaction among many
traders. The only social structure is a market, a mechanism which adjusts prices
such that supply equals demand. This mechanism is able to allocate scarce means
efficiently making any social pattern other than the market itself superfluous. However,
we observe that people do hold personal network-like relations to each other. There is
an extensive sociological literature documenting various patterns of social relations in
networks (see Wellmann and Berkowitz for a survey [55]). Granovetter [27] criticizes the
pure ”market” approach of economics and proposes the concept of social embeddedness:
social structures affect economic actions through various mechanisms.
Chapter 4 studies the influence of social structures on market outcomes in form
of a communication network. In a community where trust and cooperative behavior
cannot be assured, network based mechanisms are important institutions. The mecha-
nisms work through communication and fear of punishment for misbehavior or through
anticipation of reward in case of good behavior. For example, ethnic communities such
as the Dominicans in New York and the Cubans in Miami use such systems to sustain
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informal credit channels (see Portes and Sensenbrenner [46]). The well known rotating
credit associations among Asian immigrants, for example the Chinese on Java, rely on
trust enforcement through network mechanisms as well (see Granovetter [28]).
There are two questions which concern the structure of such a communication
network. First, information, judgements and gossip are exchanged only among close
friends in such a network. This implies that a network member may use his close friends
as an effective threat to enforce cooperative behavior. The mechanism is simple: if the
partner with whom I interact today cheats on me, I inform my close friends which in
turn cheat on the noncooperator tomorrow. It seems optimal to choose the number
of close friends as large as possible. The second question concerns the optimal size of
the communication network. If interaction with network members yields cooperation
while this is impossible with agents outside the network, it seems best to have a huge
network.
In chapter 4 I discuss these issues in a setting of an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma with changing partners and random matching. Before the repeated inter-
action starts, agents form a network and each network member chooses a number of
contacts to other network members. If two agents meet, they observe the number
of contacts their partner has. Then they play the Prisoner’s Dilemma. After having
played the stage game, they inform their close contacts about the partner’s choice of
action. In such a setting, the community wishes to choose a huge network. Moreover,
it is best if all network members have close contacts to all other network members:
this is the most effective threat inducing the most severe punishments. These findings
stand in contrast to the following observations. First, people do not entertain close
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contacts to all people in their network of personal relations4. Second, networks with a
large number of participants are ineffective.
To provide a rationale for these observations, I introduce noise in the communi-
cation among agents. There are many reasons why communication should be noisy.
Either I might inform my friends mistakenly about my partner’s behavior or there might
be some distortion in the technology used to transmit information. There might also
be errors in interpretation of messages actually sent correctly. Then a network mem-
ber has to fulfill his punishment obligation although nobody did defect or a network
member might get punished although he behaved cooperatively. It is then optimal not
to entertain close contacts to all other network members: it is best to have a number of
close contacts which is just enough to deter other agents from defecting. More noise has
another detrimental effect: suppose that each agent receives noisy information about
a partner not only from the network member who interacted last with that partner,
but also from all other network members - gossip. Then, as the number of agents in
the network gets large, cooperation fails. The reason is that network members cannot
distinguish between information with content and pure noisy information stemming
from gossip. If the network cannot provide cooperation and if there is a cost to set up
the network then the community does not form a network at all.
4see Boissevain [11].
19
20
Chapter 2
Sequential Moves and Comparative
Statics in Strategic Market Games
2.1 Introduction
Strategic market games have been developed by Shubik [53] and Shapley and Shubik
[52] as an alternative to Cournot oligopoly models. In strategic market game models,
traders send simultaneously bids and supplies of goods to the market mechanism. The
ratio of bids and supplies exchanged for a good determine its terms of trade. Strategic
market games are models of exchange in which all players behave strategically. This
is deemed to be an advantage over Cournot oligopoly models where the demand side
behaves non-strategically.
A recent paper by Bloch and Ghosal [10] suggests that strategic market games
a` la Shapley and Shubik might have a rather counterintuitive property: an increase
in the number of traders on the one side of the market might increase equilibrium
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utilities for all traders, i.e. those on the same side of the market as well as those on
the other side of the market (Bloch and Ghosal [10], p. 375). The finding contrasts
with the familiar Cournot result that an increase in the number of sellers implies lower
profits for each one of them. In general, Bloch’s and Ghosal’s results show that the
effect of an increase in the numbers of traders of the same type cannot be predicted.
In contrast, an increase in the number of traders of the other type is always beneficial.
For symmetric markets, that is, markets with the same number of traders on each side
of the market, Bloch and Ghosal show that all traders benefit from an increase in the
number of traders (Proposition 2.2.).
In fact there are two differences between strategic market games a` la Shapley-
Shubik and Cournot oligopoly models. Strategic market game models exhibit strategic
behavior from all traders and simultaneity of all moves. The main motivation for the
present chapter is to regain comparative statics properties as known from Cournot
oligopolies for Shapley-Shubik strategic market games. This chapter considers a se-
quential version of the Shapley-Shubik models. I present an example where in the
simultaneous version traders benefit from an increase in the number of traders of the
same type. I show that this counterintuitive result does not hold for the first movers
in the sequential version of the game. Hence the finding of Bloch and Ghosal concerns
sequential versus simultaneous moves games rather than Shapley-Shubik strategic mar-
ket games versus Cournot oligopoly models. Both in the simultaneous version and in
the sequential version, an increase in the number of traders on the other side of the
market is beneficial. For symmetric markets, I find that effects on first-movers’ utilities
are ambiguous as the number of traders increases.
I develop a model similar to the one used in Bloch and Ghosal [10]. There are
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two goods and two types of traders, buyers and sellers: each buyer’s utility is quadratic
and quasilinear and sellers’ utility is linear. Sellers hence could be interpreted as firms.
Each trader type initially owns one unit of one of the goods only. The timing in the
model is sequential: the sellers choose their strategy first. The buyers observe the
sellers’ choices and make their move. I adopt subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as the
solution concept.
After setting up the model, I illustrate the main qualitative implication of se-
quential moves versus simultaneous moves in strategic market games. I compute the
Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous moves version of the game and show that sellers’
equilibrium utilities might increase as the sellers’ number increases. Buyers’ equilib-
rium utilities increase always as the number of buyers increases. For both sides of the
market the very intuition from Cournot oligopolies does not hold.
I then study the sequential version with the sellers moving first and find that an
increase in the number of sellers has always the expected negative effect on the sellers’
utilities! Intuitively, the buyers’ behavior in the second stage forces sellers to decrease
their individual equilibrium supplies. The equilibrium price decreases as well so that
the overall effect is unambiguous. Buyers still benefit from an increase in the number
of buyers! If the market is symmetric, the sellers might benefit from a decrease in the
number of traders while the buyers benefit from an increase in the number of traders.
Apart from implications for comparative statics, the sequential model produces
further results. In their paper, Bloch and Ghosal study the formation of trading groups
in bilateral oligopoly. They find that the only strongly stable trading structure is the
grand coalition where all agents trade on the same market. A trading group is strongly
stable, if no coalition of traders can deviate such that all of its members obtain at
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least as high as a utility as before and some members obtain a strictly higher utility.
I find that with sequential moves other strongly stable trading structures might exist.
Intuitively, this finding is based on the result that, for symmetric markets, first-movers
might prefer markets with a small number of traders.
The introduction of sequential moves has a further implication. In simultaneous
moves strategic market games there is always a no-trade equilibrium. The strategic
market games literature contains many results that predict Walrasian equilibria in the
competitive limit.1 However, they usually come at the expense of ad hoc assumptions
that rule out the pathological no-trade equilibrium. My sequential moves strategic
market game eliminates the no-trade equilibrium and I show, albeit only by means of
an example, convergence of the unique subgame perfect equilibrium to the Walrasian
equilibrium as the number of traders gets large. Weyers [56] proposes a much more
complex game to eliminate the no-trade equilibrium. She studies a strategic market
game with limit prices.2 The set of Nash equilibria of this game converges to the set
containing the competitive equilibria and the no-trade equilibrium, when players are
replicated. Two-rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies eliminate
the no-trade equilibria in her model.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the basic model
for the comparative statics analysis. Section 2.3 provides a detailed study of compar-
ative statics effects and compares the outcomes to those obtained in the simultaneous
moves setting. In section 2.4 I discuss the implications of my findings for the formation
1See Mas-Colell [37] for an overview.
2The limit price mechanism of Mertens [40] is a mechanism for determining prices and final allo-
cation when agents trade a finite number of goods by placing an arbitrary number of market or limit
orders.
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of trading groups. Section 2.5 presents Walras convergence and section 2.6 proves exis-
tence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for more general strategic market games
with sequential moves.
2.2 The Model
The model setup in this section follows roughly Bloch and Ghosal [10], except for the
different timing.
There are two finite sets of traders: B := {1, ..., B} and S := {1, ..., S}. Traders
are indexed i = 1, ..., B with i ∈ B and j = 1, ..., S with j ∈ S. Traders i ∈ B are
called buyers and traders j ∈ S are called sellers.
There are two tradeable goods in the economy, x and y. Good x will sometimes
be called ”money”, good y is a consumption good, say wheat. The final allocation
of money and wheat for the traders are denoted by xi, xj, yi and yj, respectively.
Endowments are distributed so that all buyers have one unit of money and all sellers
have one unit (or bushel) of wheat.
I assume that the sellers move first (all sellers move simultaneously). Each seller
j decides what amount of wheat he wants to supply. The buyers observe the sellers’
choices and make their strategy choices (simultaneously ). Each buyer i decides what
amount of money he would like to pay.
The sellers’ strategy sets are given by
Aj := {sj |sj ∈ R+0 , 0 ≤ sj ≤ 1}.
Let A := ×j∈SAj and let s ∈ A denote the strategy profile for the sellers, that is
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s = (s1, ..., sS). The buyers’ strategy sets are given by
Ai := {bi(·) | bi : A→ [0, 1]}.
Again, b(·) = (b1(·), ..., bB(·)) denotes the strategy profiles for the buyers. Let s :=∑
j∈S sj and b(·) :=
∑
i∈B bi(·).
The strategy choices (s, b(·)) determine the market clearing price p for one unit
of wheat as
p =
b(s)
s
(2.1)
and the final allocation
yi =
bi(s)
p
, (2.2)
xi = 1− bi(s), (2.3)
yj = 1− sj, (2.4)
xj = sj · p. (2.5)
I define 0
0
:= 0.
The corresponding payoffs are
U(b(·), s) = f
(
bi(s)
p
)
+ (1− bi(s)), (2.6)
where
f
(
bi(s
p
)
= α
(
bi(s)
p
)
− β
2
(
bi(s)
p
)2
(2.7)
for all buyers i ∈ B. We assume that, for all (b(·), s) and for all α > 0, there exists
β < α, β > 0 such that U ′′ < 0 and f ′ > 0. It is easy to check that the condition
0 < β < α for all α > 0 is in fact sufficient for U ′′ < 0 and f ′ > 0.
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The payoffs for the sellers are given by
pi(b(·), s) = sj · p+ (1− sj) (2.8)
for all j ∈ S.
I chose risk neutrality for the sellers to interpret sellers as firms. This allows me
to relate the model and its results to Cournot oligopoly models.
2.3 Comparative Statics and Timing
In this section, I examine and compare comparative statics effects for the simultaneous
moves and the sequential moves case. First, I recapitulate briefly the comparative
statics results obtained by Bloch and Ghosal [10] for the simultaneous moves version
of the model in section 2.2.
2.3.1 Simultaneous Moves
For the simultaneous moves setting the buyers’ strategy sets are given by
Ai := {bi|bi ∈ R, 0 ≤ bi ≤ 1}
for all i.
It is straightforward to compute the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies(
b̂, ŝ
)
,
b̂ =
1
β
S
S − 1
(
α− B
B − 1
S
S − 1
)
(2.9)
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and
ŝ =
1
β
B
S
(
α− B
B − 1
S
S − 1
)
. (2.10)
Suppose that
α >
B
B − 1
S
S − 1 ,
so that the existence of an interior solution is guaranteed.
I obtain the Nash equilibrium by differentiating the payoff functions of all traders
with respect to their referring strategy. The first-order conditions are necessary and
sufficient due to the assumptions on α and β. A simple argument shows that any Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies must by type-symmetric: all sellers employ the same
strategy and all buyers employ the same strategy.
The equilibrium price is given by
p =
S
S − 1 . (2.11)
Equilibrium payoffs are
pi
(
b̂, ŝ
)
=
1
β
B
S(S − 1)
(
α− B
B − 1
S
S − 1
)
+ 1 (2.12)
and
U
(
b̂, ŝ
)
=
1
β
(
α− B
B − 1
S
S − 1
)(
α− S
S − 1
)
(2.13)
−β
2
(
α
β
− 1
β
B
B − 1
S
S − 1
)2
+ 1. (2.14)
Simple computations yield the following comparative statics result.
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Result 1. The Nash equilibrium satisfies
(R1)
∂U
∂B
> 0, (R2)
∂U
∂S
> 0, (R3)
∂pi
∂B
> 0.
Moreover,
(R4)
∂pi
∂S
> 0
if and only if
α <
B
B − 1
S
S − 1
2S
2S − 1 .
Results (R1) and (R4) demonstrate the counterintuitive property which a strate-
gic market game a` la Shapley and Shubik might have. An increase in the number of
sellers might increase sellers’ equilibrium utilities and an increase in the number of
buyers increases buyers’ equilibrium utilities. The results (R2) and (R3) are what one
would expect.
2.3.2 Sequential Moves: The Sellers as First-Movers
For the sequential moves version with the sellers as first movers, the buyers’ Nash
equilibrium strategies in the second stage are given by
b∗ = α
B − 1
B2
s− βB − 1
B3
s2. (2.15)
The problem in the first stage reduces to finding a Nash equilibrium in a game among
the sellers with payoff functions
pi(sj, s−j) = sj(D − C s) + (1− sj), (2.16)
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where
D = α
B − 1
B
and C = β
B − 1
B2
. (2.17)
As unique subgame perfect equilibrium strategies, I obtain
s∗1 =
D − 1
C(S + 1)
(2.18)
and
b∗1 = α
B − 1
B2
S(D − 1)
C(S + 1)
− βB − 1
B3
(
S(D − 1)
C(S + 1)
)2
. (2.19)
Equilibrium payoffs are
pi1(b
∗, s∗) =
(D − 1)2
C(S + 1)2
+ 1 (2.20)
and
U1(b
∗, s∗) = α
(
S(D − 1)
BC(S + 1)
)
− β
2
(
S(D − 1)
BC(S + 1)
)2
− αB − 1
B2
S(D − 1)
C(S + 1)
(2.21)
+β
B − 1
B3
(
S(D − 1)
C(S + 1)
)2
+ 1. (2.22)
A simple computation gives
Result 2. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with the sellers moving first satisfies
(R5)
∂U1
∂B
> 0, (R6)
∂U1
∂S
> 0, (R7)
∂pi1
∂B
> 0, (R8)
∂pi1
∂S
< 0.
Result (R8) states the main point of this chapter: the introduction of sequential
moves gives us back the intuitive effect of an increase in the sellers’ number on their
equilibrium utilities - as opposed to (R4). However, an increase in the buyers’ number
still leads to higher equilibrium utilities for the buyers.
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2.3.3 Sequential Moves: The Buyers as First-Movers
For the sake of completeness I also analyze the case with the buyers as first movers.
Again, a straightforward computation of the subgame perfect equilibrium gives
s∗2 =
B(α(S − 1)− S)
βS2
(2.23)
and
b∗2 =
α(S − 1)− S
β(S − 1) (2.24)
as unique equilibrium strategies. Equilibrium payoffs are
pi2(b
∗, s∗) =
B(α(S − 1)− S)
βS2(S − 1) + 1 (2.25)
and
U2(b
∗, s∗) = α
(
α(S − 1)− S
βS
)
− β
2
(
α(S − 1)− S
βS
)2
(2.26)
+1− α(S − 1)− S
β(S − 1) . (2.27)
Result 3. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with the buyers moving first satisfies
(R9)
∂U2
∂B
= 0.
Moreover,
(R10)
∂pi
∂S
> 0
if and only if
α >
S3 − 3S2 + S
S3 − 3S2 + 3S − 1 .
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As in the simultaneous moves setting, result (R10) asserts that an increase in
the number of sellers might increase sellers’ equilibrium utilities if they move second.
Thus, the order of moves is a relevant aspect for comparative statics results. Result
(R9) shows that an increase in the buyers’ number does not affect their equilibrium
utilities at all. This result seems to come from the assumption of sellers’ risk-neutrality.
2.3.4 Discussion
The results (R2) and (R3) are what one would expect and will not be further com-
mented on. For (R1), note that an increase in the number of buyers induces an in-
creased bidding from the buyers for wheat. The increased bidding lets sellers increase
their wheat supplies as well, leading to an increased trading volume in the market. The
increased trading volume has no effects on the equilibrium price then because of the
constant seller markup. The intuition for (R4) is similar. An increase in the number
of sellers induces an increased wheat supply. The increased supply leads to an increase
in buyers’ bids of money. Here the increased trading volume of wheat has an effect on
the equilibrium price; the increase in the number of sellers leads to a lower equilibrium
price. For α small enough, however, the positive effect on quantities overcompensates
the negative price effect on sellers’ equilibrium utilities.
With sequential trade the increase in the number of buyers still affects the buy-
ers positively ((R5)). In contrast, result (R8) shows that sellers’ equilibrium utilities
cannot increase as their number increases. Again the increase in the number of sellers
leads to increased bids of the buyers. While the aggregate equilibrium quantity of
wheat supplied by the sellers increases, each individual seller’s wheat supply decreases.
So does the equilibrium price for wheat. These are the effects we usually should expect
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from a Cournot oligopoly model. Only if the sellers move second, competition may be
advantageous for them ((R10)). Thus, there are two points to be noted:
1. The introduction of sequential moves in strategic market game models makes it
possible that the very intuition from Cournot oligopolies can be regained. An
important difference between Cournot oligopolies and Shapley-Shubik strategic
market games concerns the timing, not only that in Shapley-Shubik strategic
market games all traders behave strategically.
2. It is important who moves first and who moves second. Traders still find it
advantageous to be more numerous if they move second.
What accounts for the differences between results (R8) and (R4)? In the sequen-
tial moves framework, (cf.(R8)), the sellers face a given reaction from the buyers. The
buyer’s strategy choice in stage two restricts the possible price-quantity combinations
for the sellers. In my model the buyers’ strategy choices play the restrictive role of
the demand curve in Cournot oligopoly models and the relevant aspects for the sell-
ers’ revenues are the elasticities along that curve. For (R4) these restrictions are such
that the individual wheat quantity cannot increase for a seller if the number of sellers
increases.
In the simultaneous moves framework the buyers’ strategy choices do not play
this restrictive role. The simultaneity of moves may even cause buyers to adjust their
strategy choices such that they are willing to buy a much larger quantity of wheat than
before. If buyers buy a much larger quantity, sellers increase their individual wheat
supplies as well, which finally might result in higher equilibrium utilities.
How general are these comparative statics results? In particular, how general is
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the result that first-movers never benefit from an increase in the number of traders on
the own side of the market? For more general utility functions for the buyers, the setting
with risk-neutral sellers moving first is very similar to a Cournot oligopoly. Seade [51]
has shown for a Cournot oligopoly with a general inverse demand function that firms
never benefit from more competition if firms’ payoff functions are concave and if a
certain equilibrium stability condition holds. It is not obvious if the same sufficient
conditions are relevant here and how to transfer these insights to the sequential moves
Shapley-Shubik game. While concavity could simply be imposed in the sequential
Shapley-Shubik game, it is not clear how to formulate a dynamic that selects the
subgame perfect equilibrium and how the stability condition would have to look like.
2.4 Stable Trading Structures
In their paper Bloch and Ghosal characterize stable trading structures. They show that
the only strongly stable trading structure is the grand coalition where all agents trade
on the same market. I shall argue that there might be other strongly stable structure
if moves are sequential. To save on notation I keep the discussion informal.
Let me first introduce some notions from Bloch’s and Ghosal’s analysis. A trad-
ing group is a collection of traders of both types who agree to trade with one another.
Agents can only trade inside their trading group. Different trading groups hence cor-
respond to separate markets. A trading structure is a collection of trading groups on
which agents trade. Bloch and Ghosal focus on trading structures where all traders
participate to a market, no agents are excluded from trading. A trading structure
is strongly stable if no coalition of traders can form a trading group in which all its
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members obtain at least as high a utility as before and some traders obtain a strictly
higher utility.
Bloch and Ghosal show that the only strongly stable trading structure is the
structure in which all agents trade on the same market (Proposition 3.2). The proof
relies on two comparative statics results: Proposition 2.2 in their paper says that in
symmetric markets, i.e. markets with the same number N of buyers and sellers, all
agents prefer N to be large. Proposition 2.3 states that all agents prefer an increase in
the number of agents on the other side of the market. Suppose now that B = S = N
and that α = 2, β = 1.3 Then, in the simultaneous moves version, Proposition 2.2 of
Bloch and Ghosal [10] holds. Since Proposition 2.3 of their paper holds as well, the
only strongly stable structure is the grand coalition where all agents trade on the same
market. Note that this result does not depend on the values of α, as long as N exceeds
4. Consider now the sequential moves version. Sellers’ equilibrium utilities are given
by
pis(b
∗, s∗) =
(N − 2)2
(N − 1)(N + 1)2 . (2.28)
A quick computation shows that this function has a unique maximum at N = N∗ ≈
6.733! Hence it is increasing for N < N∗ while it is decreasing for N > N∗ To under-
stand this result, note that an increase in N has two effects on a seller’s equilibrium
utility. First, as N increases buyers bid less strategically and increase their bids which
is beneficial for the sellers.
This is the usual effect in strategic market game models as the number of agents
gets large. On the other hand, we have the effect known from Cournot oligopolies: an
3The values for α and β are chosen for the sake of exposition. The finding of this section also holds
for other values of α and β.
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increase in the number of sellers lowers individual quantities sold and the equilibrium
price. For N small enough, the first effect dominates the second one. For N large
enough the negative effect dominates! Hence, independent from the effect of an increase
in N on the buyers’ equilibrium utilities, sellers have an incentive of forming small
trading groups. Proposition 2.2 from Bloch and Ghosal does not hold in the sequential
model! The buyers’ equilibrium utility is
Us(b
∗, s∗) =
(N − 2)(3N4 −N3 + 2N2 + 2N − 2)
2(N2 − 1)2(N + 1) , (2.29)
which is strictly increasing in N . These findings have the following implication. Sup-
pose that the overall number of agents is kN∗, k ≥ 2. Then a trading structure with k
separate submarkets with N∗ buyers and sellers in each submarket might be strongly
stable. The reason is as follows. In Bloch and Ghosal (Proposition 3.2.) any such
trading structure is not stable since all traders would agree to form one single market.
This holds since all traders prefer large symmetric markets to small symmetric marktes
if traders move simultaneously. However sellers do prefer small symmetric markets if
they move first and we cannot be sure if there are other strongly stable trading struc-
tures apart from the grand coalition. Any statement about the formation of trading
groups in the sense of Bloch and Ghosal hence rests on the particular utility functions
used if one considers a sequential moves model.
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2.5 Elimination of the No-Trade Equilibrium and
Walrasian Convergence
Suppose that
Ui(b(·), s) =
√
bi(s/p) + (1− bi(s)) (2.30)
and
pij(b, s) =
√
sjp+ (1− sj). (2.31)
Moreover, I set B = S = N and label the game G.
If buyers and sellers move simultaneously, there are in fact two Nash equilibria.
First, there is the no-trade equilibrium, that is, bˆ = sˆ = 0. Second, there is a Nash
equilibrium with trade given by
bˆ = sˆ =
(N − 1)2
4N2
. (2.32)
The Walrasian equilibrium for the given economy, with B = S = N , is given by
xi = 3/4, xj = 1/4, yi = 1/4, yj = 3/4, p = 1. From previous results (e.g. Shapley and
Shubik [52]), we also know that the following holds.
Result 4. As N → ∞, the Nash equilibrium with trade coincides with the Walrasian
equilibrium. Final allocations xi, yi, xj, yj and equilibrium prices are the same.
As Weyers [56] argues this result comes at the expense of some ad hoc assumption
that rules out the pathological no trade equilibrium. Weyers [56] proposes a strategic
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market game with limit prices to solve this problem.4 The set of Nash equilibria of this
game converges to the set containing the competitive equilibria and no-trade, when
players are replicated. Two-rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies
eliminate the no-trade equilibria. A sequential moves strategic market game proposes
another, simpler solution to the problem of no-trade equilibria. In essence, traders face
a coordination problem, where one equilibrium, the trade equilibrium pareto-dominates
the no-trade equilibrium. It is well known that in a 2-player coordination game with
sequential moves and perfect information the Pareto-dominant equilibrium emerges as
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Hence only the trade-equilibrium emerges in
my sequential strategic market game.
I now compute the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with sequential
moves and start in the second stage of the game. Given any choice s from the sellers,
the buyers solve
max
b(s)
√
bi(s)/p+ 1− bi(s). (2.33)
Letting φi(s) denote a buyer’s equilibrium strategy in each subgame, one obtains
φi(s) =
N − 1
N3/2
√
s ∀i ∈ B. (2.34)
The sellers solve
max
sj
(
sj
N · φi(s)∑
j sj
)1/2
+ 1− sj. (2.35)
This gives
4The limit price mechanism of Mertens [40] is a mechanism for determining prices and final allo-
cation when agents trade a finite number of goods by placing an arbitrary number of market or limit
orders.
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Result 5. For the sequential moves game, with B = S = N , the unique equilibrium
strategies are given by
s∗ =
(
N − 1
2N
)2/3(
2N − 1
4N
)4/3
(2.36)
and
b∗ =
(
N − 1
2N
)4/3(
2N − 1
4N
)2/3
. (2.37)
The equilibrium price is
p =
(
2N − 2
2N − 1
)2/3
. (2.38)
The result states that no-trade is not an equilibrium of the sequential moves
version of the strategic market game. Letting N →∞, gives the result of the following
Proposition.
Proposition 1. As N →∞, the final allocation and the equilibrium prices of sequential
moves strategic market game coincide with the allocation and the equilibrium prices of
the Walrasian equilibrium.
Walras convergence has been previously established for simultaneous moves strate-
gic market games.5 Proposition 1 states that Walras convergence can be obtained for
sequential moves strategic market games as well. The robustness of a convergence
property with respect to a change in the timing has been noted by Robson [48]. He
shows that the equilibria of a Stackelberg oligopoly model converge to the efficient
equilibrium as the number of firms tends to infinity.
5See Mas-Colell [37] for an overview.
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2.6 Existence of a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
In this section, I discuss existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for a more
general strategic market game model with sequential moves.
I modify the model and let the payoff functions be
U(b(·), s) = f(bi(s)/p) + (1− bi(s)) (2.39)
and
pi(b, s) = f(sj · p) + (1− sj). (2.40)
We assume that the function f is a strictly increasing and strictly concave func-
tion,
f ′′ < 0 < f ′ (2.41)
over the whole domain. Moreover, f is twice continuously differentiable.
Strategy sets are defined as in section 2. The following definition formalizes the
solution concept for the game.
Definition 1. Subgame perfect equilibrium. The profiles (b∗, s∗) corresponds to a sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if, for all i ∈ B and for all j ∈ S,
(i) s∗j ∈ argmax
s′j∈[0,1]
pij(s
′
j, s
∗
−j, b
∗).
and, for all subgames induced by s,
(i) b∗i (·) ∈ argmax
bi(·)′∈[0,1]
Ui(bi(s)
′, b∗−i(s), s
∗).
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Proposition 2. In the sequential strategic market game for S ≥ 1, B ≥ 2 there exists
a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, s∗1 = ... = s
∗
S and b
∗
1 = ... = b
∗
B.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 asserts that there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies - even for the case with one seller (S = 1). It is well known that Nash
equilibria in simultaneous moves strategic market games do not exist for S = 1.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter focusses on the implications of sequential moves on comparative statics
results in strategic market games a` la Shapley-Shubik. I have shown by means of an
example that counterintuitive effects of more competition (i.e.more traders on the same
side of the market) might vanish if the timing in such games is sequential. Moreover,
results on the formation of trading groups and Walrasian convergence were established.
I also provided an existence proof of a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Let us consider one last implication of sequential moves strategic market games.
Shapley-Shubik games provide a modelling framework for collusion or cartel formation
in markets where all agents act strategically. Suppose that we are in the simultaneous
moves world of section 2.3 and that one side of the market, the sellers, say, aims to
maximize the sellers’ joint surplus. Suppose also that it is feasible to enforce implicit
collusive behavior.
A quick computation shows that sellers maximize their joint revenue by setting
s = 0. Then the buyers’ best response is to bid nothing (see equation (2.15)). Hence,
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implicit collusion based on joint surplus maximization is not profitable for the sellers!
This changes if we are in a world with sequential moves. As shown in section 2.3.2, the
situation with sequential moves is very similar to the one where Cournot oligopolists
face a linear demand curve. And we do know that a strategy which maximizes joint
revenue is available and profitable (i.e. provides higher utility than the utility with
individual maximization) in this situation. Hence moving first provides sellers with
a profitable strategy which maximizes joint revenue while this is not feasible with
simultaneous moves.
Suppose further that moves are sequential but that cartel formation cannot be
enforced. Then, standard infinitely repeated game arguments could be used to study
self-enforcing implicit collusion. In particular, one could examine how the results by
Green [29] and Lambson [36] extend to the case of strategic agents on both sides of
the markets. Lambson, in particular, shows whether the folk theorem holds as the
number of firms in an infinitely repeated Cournot oligopoly increases without bounds.
He shows that the folk theorem holds in the limit iff demand increases at the same
rate as the number of firms and if some bound on the Cournot price sequence exists.
It could be interesting to discuss a similar question in a setting where all agents act
strategically. In particular, what can be said about sustaining collusion as the ratio
number of sellers/number of buyers varies? From the previous paragraph, it seems that
such an analysis should be based on a model with sequential rather than simultaneous
moves.
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Chapter 3
The Effects of Competition on
Bargaining Power in Repeated
Bilateral Negotiations
3.1 Introduction
” We have a saying at this company: our competitors are our friends and our
customers are our enemies...God damn buyers [are the enemy]. We’ve gotta have
them. But they are not my friends. You’re my friend. I want to be closer to you
than I am to any customer because you can make us money.” (a former executive
of Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM), a lysine producer)1
1Lysine is a food additive designed to put additional meat on hogs. The quote was recorded by an
FBI mole. Largely on the basis of the audio- and videotapes he provided, a federal jury in Chicago
convicted three former ADM executives in September 1998 of engaging in an international conspiracy
to fix lysine prices. See http://www.wwnorton.com/mip/ime/varian/28b.htm for more.
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Many intermediate goods markets today are characterized by market power on
both the seller and the buyer side. For example, markets for retailing tend to involve
significant market power of retail chains. The power of such chains is a matter of serious
policy concern (see Dobson and Waterson [17] and [18]). As a result both producers
as sellers and retail chains as buyers exercise market power. The market structure is a
bilateral oligopoly.
In many cases, prices in such markets are negotiated by bilateral negotiations.
For example, most business-to-business goods are traded through bilateral contracts.
Spot markets, organized as exchanges or auctions, are just the tiny tip of a huge market
of such one-to-one deals (see The Economist [19]).
Economists’ understanding of bilateral oligopoly is very incomplete. What are
the prices negotiated, and how does the distribution of surplus depend on the number
of buyers and the number of sellers? What is the role of agents’ information and
strategies? What are the effects of repeated transactions? Is there scope for implicit
collusion in such a market as we know it from Cournot or Bertrand markets? The
meaning of the quote above seems clear in the context of a Cournot market: competitors
may be friends if they help to sustain collusive prices in a given market, for example,
by reducing production quantities. In a bilateral oligopoly where prices are negotiated,
matters are not all that obvious!
To see why consider the situation of a bilateral monopoly in which the seller
makes all the offers. The seller has zero value for the good, the buyer has a commonly
known value of one. The buyer can accept or reject an offer. The infinite repetition
of the stage game does not preclude the buyer from extracting all the surplus.2 If the
2Every trader maximizes the sum of his discounted per-period utilities from transactions.
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buyer accepts any slightly unsatisfactory offer - even if this were better than not to
buy at all - he gets ”punished” by switching to the worst equilibrium in the rest of
the relation. In a market where many transactions as this one take place in isolation,
the presence of other buyers does not matter for any individual buyer: the argument
based on the Folk Theorem does not rely on other buyers providing punishments as in a
Cournot oligopoly model. It is then not clear why the above quote - with interchanged
roles of buyers and sellers - should hold. I shall argue that ”competitors are friends”
for the buyers if there are outside options for the buyers in form of alternative trading
partners!
This chapter presents a model of bilateral oligopoly and analyzes the effects of
repeated interaction and competition on bargaining outcomes in a market with bilateral
negotiations. Sellers make all offers and have value zero for the good, the buyers have
a commonly known value of one. Every trader maximizes the sum of his discounted
per-period utilities from transactions. I look for optimal equilibria from the buyers’
perspective under the following three types of trading models: (1) a randomly matched
pair of a seller and a buyer repeat their negotiations forever, (2) a buyer has an outside
option to negotiate with an alternative seller who has no information about the buyers
trading history and (3) a buyer can visit a new seller who is currently matched to
another buyer, and if this happens, the two buyers compete for the seller. I show that
the order of equilibrium payoffs of a buyer in the three trading models is (1) > (3) > (2).
While a buyer can exploit all the surplus in (1), an outside option to trade with a
new seller with no information of trading history is - contrary to economic intuition -
harmful to the buyer in (2). The presence of other buyers and buyers’ competition in
(3) limits the value of the outside option. The equilibrium sustained by competition
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can be interpreted as implicit buyer collusion since it is similar to price war equilibria
sustaining implicit collusion in repeated oligopoly game models with centralized trading
mechanisms.
Theories of markets with decentralized trade have mainly been developed in mod-
els with random matching and one-shot bargaining interaction (see Osborne and Ru-
binstein [44] for an excellent overview). These are mostly models with a one-shot-
bargaining scenario, e.g. Diamond [16], Rubinstein and Wolinksy [49] and [50], Gale
[25], Binmore and Herrero [9], Vincent [54] and, more recently, de Fraja and Sa´kovics
[15] and Ponsati [45]. In particular, Rubinstein andWolinsky [50] and Vincent [54] show
how bargaining outcomes in markets depend on the amount of information agents use
and how ”punishment” mechanisms sustain certain equilibria. I examine the effective-
ness of punishments and their dependence on information and strategic options for
repeated bargaining transactions. I assume less information flow than Rubinstein and
Wolinksy [50] (section 2 and section 4 in their paper) and Vincent [54] (section 2 in his
paper).3 For example, traders do not know other traders’ identities and do not know
the trading history of a new trading partner.
Just as Rubinstein and Wolinsky [50] or Vincent [54] for one-shot bargaining
games, the literature on the folk theorem in repeated games (see Fudenberg and Tirole
[24], ch.5) discusses how certain equilibria can be sustained by punishment strategies.
Repeated games have also formed our understanding of implicit collusion sustained by
the threat of competition in markets with centralized trading mechanisms (e.g. Abreu
[3], Friedman [23] and Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [2]). This chapter shows how
Abreu’s and Friedman’s ideas may be employed in a framework with decentralized
3see Muthoo [42], ch.10 for an overview on repeated bargaining with two players
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trading mechanisms. I show how competition among buyers enlarges the surplus buy-
ers can extract if other punishment mechanisms are of restricted use due to limited
information flow.
The chapter is also related the literature studying market power in bargaining
situations, e.g. Gul, Sonnenschein andWilson [32]. Bargaining games under incomplete
information can be interpreted as a market in which a monopoly seller makes sequential
offers to buyers with different valuation. As in my paper, sellers make all the offers
in these works. In some circumstances, buyers can extract all the surplus from the
bargaining, that is, the Coase conjecture holds. Gul [31] and Ausubel and Deneckere
[6] show that the presence of a second seller provides for better equilibria for the sellers
since they can collude, supported by price wars in case of a deviation. This effect
is similar to the one in my model. The difference is that the market studied in this
chapter is a bilateral oligopoly rather than the durable goods oligopoly studied in those
papers.
To explain the relation of the main arguments in the chapter, I shall provide an
informal description of the model and its main results. I introduce the basic model in
section 3.2. A seller has a commonly known value of zero for the good, a buyer has a
commonly known value of one. In each one-shot transaction the seller makes an offer
to the buyer who can accept or reject. The infinite repetition of this stage game does
not preclude the buyer from extracting all the surplus. Threats to refuse any slightly
unsatisfactory offer - even if this would be advantageous - are credible if acceptance
induces a reputation for softness and implies worst equilibria in the rest of the relation.
In section 3.3 I show that outside options in form of alternative trading partners
reduce the buyer’s surplus. Outside options yield more benign equilibria than the worst
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equilibrium in the continuation of the current relationship. The argument presumes
that the alternative trading partners have no information about a buyer’s trading
history. Hence, they cannot be integrated into a system of punishment strategies.
I characterize the equilibria with the maximal surplus for the buyers by arguments
similar to the optimal penal code of Abreu [1].
In section 3.4, I allow buyers to leave their trading partner and to compete for
a seller who is currently matched to another buyer. I also allow each trading pair to
observe the bargaining history of another buyer. Then, the presence of other buyers is
useful since they can be integrated into a system of punishment strategies hence limiting
the value of the outside option. One can interpret these equilibria as implicit buyer
collusion since they are similar to equilibria sustaining implicit collusion in repeated
oligopoly game models. The buyers’ payoffs in an equilibrium sustained by competition
exceed those in the best equilibrium without competition for any discount factor.
In section 3.5 I compare the model in more detail to the papers by Rubinstein
and Wolinsky [50] and Vincent [54]. I conclude in section 3.6.
3.2 Powerful Buyers
There are two sets of traders, buyers and sellers. Each set contains two traders.4 A
typical seller will be denoted by s, a typical buyer will be denoted by b. Time is discrete
and indexed by t = 1, 2, .... At each point in time, each seller receives an endowment of
one indivisible unit of some good. The good is homogenous, i.e. all sellers’ endowments
are perfect substitutes. The good is also perishable. It cannot be stored from period to
4The numbers are chosen for the sake of exposition
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period. Sellers’ valuation of their endowment is zero. Sellers derive utility from money.
A seller who sells his unit in some period at price p receives utility p in that period.
Buyers have no endowment of the good, but they have money. In each period, each
buyer has exactly one unit of money which is nonstorable. Buyers are interested in
buying at most one unit of the good. Every buyer’s valuation of the good is equal to
1. A buyer who pays a price p for the good receives in that period utility 1− p.
Both traders receive a period payoff of 0 if the seller’s offer is rejected. A trader’s
overall payoff equals the expected present value of the sums of his discounted per-
period payoffs. Sellers and buyers maximize the sums of discounted present values of
their period utilities. Sellers’ discount factor is δs ∈ (0, 1). Buyers’ discount factor is
δb ∈ (0, 1).
Initially all traders are in a matching pool. At time t = 1, the two buyers get
matched to the two sellers. Each buyer is assigned to one seller, and no seller is
matched to more than one buyer. I denote a relation as (bs). In the relation (bs),
seller s makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to buyer b by proposing a price ps(t) ∈ R to b.
The buyer may accept this price, (Y ), or reject the offer, (N). Denote this action as
rb(t) ∈ {Y,N}. All this continues indefinitely. Each trader observes all the events in
his relation. Strategies are functions from these histories to action sets.
This scenario might resemble a market for an intermediate good. Sellers are the
upstream firms, buyers the downstream firms which buy in each period a fixed amount
of the intermediate good. Since buyers have a positive valuation for the good, this
might be a scenario where buyers have market power on the final good sector which
allows them to make positive profits on any unit they buy from the input good. The
model focusses on the interaction in the intermediate goods market this assuming that
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profits (and hence valuations) which buyers can obtain in the final market are not
affected by whatever happens in the intermediate goods market.
Proposition 3. For δb ≥ 1/2 there is a subgame perfect equilibrium such that in each
relation the buyer and the seller trade for the price ps(t) = 0.
Proposition 3 says that in each period any buyer can extract all the surplus from
the bargaining in a subgame perfect equilibrium. A buyer supports this equilibrium
by building up a reputation for being a tough bargaining partner and by rejecting
all prices above zero. Any soft behavior, as the acceptance of a higher price, leads
to the harshest punishment possible (see Abreu [3], [1]). Buyers cannot avoid the
punishment and, anticipating this, have an incentive to stay tough for δb ≥ 1/2. Each
seller recognizes his partner as a tough bargaining partner and does not demand a price
higher than zero.
3.3 Disadvantageous Outside Options
Suppose there is a third seller. We shall see how the presence of that additional
trading partner reduces a buyer’s ability to extract surplus from the bargaining given
the amount of information sellers use. Outside options as introduced in this section
create a difficulty for the buyers which competition among buyers resolves in the next
section, section 3.4.
Remark 1. I shall comment on the assumption with three sellers and two buyers below.
The numbers are chosen for the sake of exposition and the results do not depend upon
them.
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The sequence of events is as follows: in t = 1, there is random matching. Each
buyer is assigned to one seller, and no seller is matched to more than one buyer. One
seller remains unmatched and receives a per-period payoff of zero. In each relation
(bs) the seller s proposes a price which buyer b can accept or reject. Then, b has two
options which I denote αb(t) ∈ {stay, leave}:
(i) αb(t) = stay: Stay with seller s. In that case their relation continues, in t = 2
seller s makes a proposal which b can accept or reject and so on
(ii) αb(t) = leave: Leave seller s. Then buyer b and seller s return to the matching
pool where they wait to get matched anew in the next period.
In time t = 2, there is again random matching. Any unmatched buyer gets
matched. If there is no unmatched buyer, no new match is formed. Then the same
bargaining game as before is played: each seller proposes a price to the buyer with
whom he is matched. The buyer can accept or reject this price and so forth. All this
continues indefinitely.
In each period in which he has a partner each trader only observes the price
proposed, the response to this price, and the decision of the buyer whether or not
to separate. Traders do not observe what happens in matches in which they are not
involved. Traders do not observe the identities of their trading partners.5 Summarized,
I impose
Assumption 1. All agents’ strategies can only be conditioned on the history of play
5This assumption might seem unrealistic in a setting with 5 traders. But recall that I chose the
small number for the sake of exposition. The assumption seems quite realistic in a market with more
traders.
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with the current partner.
To formalize this assumption, let b(t) denote the buyer with whom a given seller
is matched in period t and define s(t) similarly. A seller’s private bargaining history is
Hs(t) = {ps(1), rb(1)(1), αb(1)(1), ..., ps(t−1), rb(t−1)(t−1), αb(t−1)(t−1)} (3.1)
and a buyer’s private bargaining history is
Hb(t) = {ps(1)(1), rb(1), αb(1), ..., ps(t− 1), rb(t− 1), αb(t− 1)}. (3.2)
Buyer b’s acceptance decision is given by
rb(t) : Hb(t)× R −→ {Y,N} (3.3)
and the outside option strategy for b is given by
αb(t) : Hb(t)× R× {Y,N} −→ {leave, stay}. (3.4)
A buyer’s strategy set is given by
Σb = {rb(t) : Hb(t)× R→ {Y,N}} × {αb(t) : Hb(t)× R× {Y,N} → {leave, stay}}.
(3.5)
The formal description of a strategy for the seller is given by
ps(t) : Hs(t) −→ R. (3.6)
I impose a stationarity assumption on the sellers’ strategies: the seller employs
the same strategies in each buyer-seller relation no matter when the relation starts.
Assumption 2. Each seller employs the same strategy in each relation - independent
from the time t in which the relation starts.
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A seller ”has no watch” and does not distinguish between a relation that starts
in period 1 and a relation that starts in, say, period 10. In other words, any seller who
starts a new relation is not able to reconstruct his new partner’s bargaining history
just from the number of the period that relation starts.
Assumption 2 implies that traders cannot condition their behavior on the bar-
gaining history of a new trading partner, similar to the papers by Ghosh and Ray [26]
and Datta [14].6 In those papers the sets of agents are large and there is either the pos-
sibility that a match breaks down for exogenous reasons or that new agents constantly
flow in the matching pool. One or both of these modelling assumptions guarantees in
those models that it is impossible for any agent in the pool to know if a new partner is
new in the market or if he broke up an old relation. Assumption 2 restricts strategies
in the same way: a seller cannot condition his behavior on the fact that a new trading
partner broke up an old relation. I chose to work with the stationarity assumption
rather than to work with more agents to simplify the exposition. All my results extend
to the case of a large number of buyers and sellers and constant flow of new traders in
the matching pool.
Denote the set of strategies for a seller as
Σs = {ps(t) : Hs(t) −→ R} (3.7)
As usual in the study of extensive games I want to use an equilibrium concept
that is stronger than Nash equilibrium and embodies sequential rationality. Given
that the game has no subgames and that sellers’ strategies are continuous variables the
usual definitions of subgame perfect equilibrium or sequential equilibrium do not apply.
6These are papers on sustaining cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma situations when agents are
randomly matched and when there is limited information flow.
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Even so, the notion that no player wants to deviate from the equilibrium strategy at
any point in time given that all other traders stick to their equilibrium strategy is well
defined. This is because assumption 1 makes it possible to treat behavior in any one
period as if the pair played a genuine subgame. I do not give a formal definition of
this notion of sequential rationality.
I impose further restrictions on the strategy profiles and consider strategy profiles
which are characterized by (i) a sequence of target prices {pE(t)}∞t=1 which the buyers
would like to sustain and (ii) a sequence of punishment prices {pD(t)}∞t=τ+1 indicating
the continuation following the acceptance of prices higher than the target price in any
period τ . This restriction excludes, for example, strategies which ”reward” a buyer for
not accepting prices higher than the target price.
Given two sequences {pE(t)}∞t=1, {pD(t)}∞t=τ+1 the associated strategies are speci-
fied as followed.
• in the first period of any relation, the seller proposes pE(1) and the buyer accepts
any p ≤ pE(1) and rejects any p > pE(1)
• regardless of the history, the buyer never leaves
• if in all periods t′ < t the buyer has rejected any offer p > pE(t) or if no such offer
has been made, the seller proposes pE(t) and the buyer accepts any p ≤ pE(t)
and rejects any p > pE(t) for all t > t′
• if in periods τ < t the buyer has accepted any offer p > pE(τ), then the seller
proposes pD(t) from period τ + 1 on, which the buyer accepts, for all t > τ .
Strategies for all buyers and all sellers which generate the two sequences
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{pE(t)}∞t=1, {pD(t)}∞t=τ+1 are referred to as an equilibrium if for any t and any history
up to t it is sequentially rational for any trader to follow his prescribed strategy given
that all other traders follow their strategy.
Proposition 4. In an equilibrium with pE(t) := pE for all t = 1, 2..., we must have
pE(t) = 1 for all t and for all matched pairs.
Proof. Suppose there is an equilibrium with price sequences pE(t) ∈ [0, 1) satisfying
pE(t) = pE(t + 1) := pE for all t = 1, 2.... Suppose that the seller proposes a price
p, pE < p < 1 to a buyer. If pE is an equilibrium the buyer has to reject p. If the buyer
follows this prescription, his payoff is
0 +
δb
1− δb (1− p
E). (3.8)
If the buyer accepts p his payoff is
(1− p) + δbUP , (3.9)
where UP denotes maximum continuation payoff a buyer can achieve after a devia-
tion given that he gets punished for his deviation. From assumptions 1 and 2, the
punishment sequence has to be pD(t) = pE in any equilibrium and hence
UP =
(1− pE)
1− δb . (3.10)
Then accepting p is strictly profitable. This argument holds for all pE ∈ [0, 1).
Proposition 4 asserts that stationary target prices combined with an outside op-
tion in form of new trading partners cause a complete loss of the buyers’ bargaining
power. The market provides buyers with no incentives to stay tough in bargaining:
buyers can always leave their partner if they face a punishment from the next period
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on. The new trading partner does not know the deviant buyer’s trading history and
allows the buyer to extract surplus by trading to the same price as if no deviation
had occurred. But then there is no incentive for the buyer to build up a reputation
for being tough in his first relation and he is willing to accept higher prices. Sellers
anticipate this behavior and propose a price of one right away.
For non-stationary target prices buyers can extract surplus from the bargaining.
Proposition 5. If δb ∈ (1/2, 1) there is an equilibrium which generates the following
decreasing sequence of prices: pE(1) = 2 and pE(t) = 0 for all t = 2, 3, .... The
equilibrium is sustained by {pD(t)}∞t=τ+1 = {pE(t)}∞t=1 if a buyer accepts an offer p(τ) >
pE(τ) in period τ . This equilibrium yields strictly positive utilities for all buyers.
Proof. I propose the following equilibrium strategies:
• Let pE(1) = 2 and pE(t) = 0 for all t = 2, 3, ....
• For any match (bs): s proposes pE(t), b accepts all p(t) ≤ pE(t) and rejects all
p(t) > pE(t). Moreover, b never leaves s.
• If b accepts any p(τ) > pE(τ) in period τ , restart the price sequence, that is,
pD(τ + 1) = pE(1) = 2 and pD(τ + k) = 0 for all k = 2, 3, ...
The only interesting point is when s proposed p(t) > pE(t) for some t ≥ 2. The
incentive constraint for b reads
0 +
δb
1− δb ≥ (1− p(t)) + δb
(
−1 + δb
1− δb
)
(3.11)
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for all p(t), t ≥ 2. Since this incentive constraint has to hold for all p(t), it has to hold
for p(t) = 0. Rearranging terms for p(t) = 0 yields
δb ≥ 1
2
(3.12)
It is straightforward to check that all other equilibrium conditions are satisfied as well.
In particular, it is not profitable for a buyer to leave his current trading partner and try
to escape from his punishment. Buyers’ equilibrium utilities are strictly positive.
Proposition 5 demonstrates how a decreasing target price sequence yields a strictly
positive utility level for a buyer. The market provides buyers with incentives to stay
tough in bargaining if it is costly to build up a new reputation for being tough. A high
initial price keeps a buyer from leaving his current partner since any deviation triggers
a restart of the decreasing price sequence with the same trading partner. If the buyer
takes his outside option, the new partnership starts with the high first period price as
well and hence taking the outside option is not a profitable deviation.
Next, I look for optimal equilibria from the perspective of the buyer. An equi-
librium is optimal if it yields the highest payoffs for the buyer for a given discount
factor δb. This does not follow the Folk-Theorem approach which gives results on fea-
sible payoffs for discount factors ”sufficiently large”.7 Rather, I suppose that traders
are not absolutely patient.8 Denote an optimal equilibrium (target) price sequence by
{p∗(t)}∞t=1 and the equilibrium utility from {p∗(t)}∞t=1 as U(p∗). I omit the dependence
of the optimal target price sequence on δb and write simply {p∗(t)}∞t=1. As the previous
proposition suggests an optimal equilibrium target price sequence is decreasing and is
7see Fudenberg and Tirole [24], ch. 5, for a discussion of various versions of the Folk-Theorem for
perfect and imperfect information.
8see Abreu [3], [1] for a seminal analysis in this spirit.
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supported by the threat of restarting the sequence in case of a deviation.
Proposition 6. For all δb ∈ (1/2, 1), the target price sequence
p∗(1) =
1
δb
, p∗(2) = p∗(3) = ... = 0 (3.13)
is optimal and yields
U(p∗) =
(
2δb − 1
1− δb
)
1
δb
. (3.14)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remark 2. The next section introduces information leakage: after the buyer’s accep-
tance decision each trading pair (bs) receives information about the bargaining history
of buyer b′ 6= b. Note that all results of this section continue to hold even under this
additional assumption. Assumption 2 implies that in a new relation sellers would not
use any of this information, even if it were obtained in a previous match.
3.4 The Effect of Buyer Competition
This section introduces an additional action for a buyer: he can leave his trading
partner and visit the other seller who is currently trading. We shall see how this
assumption combined with some information flow implies more severe punishments
for a deviant buyer. Then, for any discount factor, buyers can extract more surplus
than in the best equilibrium of the previous section (Proposition 6). This section thus
highlights the role of competition in a market with bilateral negotiations: similar to
markets with centralized trading systems, competition may be used as an effective
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punishment system to increase market power of one side of the market. This works in
particular if other punishment mechanisms are useless due to limited information flow,
as shown in the previous section. Hence, in this setting with bilateral negotiations
buyer competition mitigates the negative effects’ from seller competition. In Cournot
or Bertrand oligopoly models, competition mitigates negative effects from competition
on the same side of the market.
The sequence of events is as follows. Again, at time t = 1, the two buyers get
matched to two sellers, one seller remains unmatched. Each buyer is assigned to one
seller, and no seller is matched to more than one buyer. In a match between two
agents, say (bs), seller s makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to buyer b by proposing a
price ps(t) ∈ R to b. The buyer may accept this price, (Y ), or reject the offer, (N).
Then the pair (bs) receives information about the bargaining history of buyer b′ 6= b.
I call this event information leakage and shall describe it in detail below. Both seller
s and buyer b receive the same information. Then, b has three options which I denote
with αb(t) ∈ {stay, leave, b’}:
(i) αb(t) = stay: stay with s
(ii) αb(t) = leave: leave s and return to the pool to get matched anew
(iii) αb(t) = b’: visit the seller who is matched to buyer b
′.
When b stays, (bs) play the same bargaining game again. When b leaves, that is, if
αb(t) = leave, then both b and s return to the matching pool. I shall explain in detail
below what happens if αb(t) = b’. All this continues indefinitely.
The sequence of events is depicted in figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Sequence of Events
Information Leakage:
Denote by Hb(t) the set of trading histories for any buyer b up to period t with
hb(t) ∈ Hb(t). An element hb(t) = ({ps(τ)(τ)}, {rb(τ)}, {αb(τ)})tτ=1 of Hb(t) is a se-
quence of price offers, possibly from various sellers, {ps(τ)(τ)}tτ=1, a sequence of ac-
tion choices {rb(τ)}tτ=1,rb(τ) ∈ {Y,N}, and a sequence of action choices {αb(τ)}tτ=1 ,
αb(τ) ∈ {stay, leave, b’},for buyer b.
In each period each matched pair (bs) observes the full experienced trading history
from period 1 to t of the other buyer, that is (bs) observes that element hb′(t) ∈ Hb′(t)
which actually occurred. An observation in period t includes price offers and responses
from the same period t. This is possible since information leakage occurs after the
trading stage. The main result does not depend on this assumption which is made for
simplicity. Denote the information which (bs) receive as I(bs)(t).
Only matched trading pairs receive information. The seller who is not matched
receives no information and any seller who returns to the pool forgets any previously
obtained information about any buyer’s bargaining history.
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Visiting other Sellers:
Suppose b chooses αb(t) = b
′ and that b′ currently trades with s′. Then the
situation is as follows. Seller s′ proposes a price to buyers b′ which b′ accepts or rejects.
If buyer b′ accepts then buyer b returns to the pool and both b′ and s′ learn the full
experienced trading history of buyer b. Then, b′ has his three options: leave, stay or
choose b, and so on, that is, (b′s′) continue their relation.
If buyer b′ rejects, he has to return to the pool and seller s′ and buyer b start a new
relation in which s′ makes a proposal to b. Buyer b can reject or accept this proposal.
If b rejects or accepts the proposal of s′, the relation between b and s′ continues with
the information leakage stage and b and s′ learn the full trading history of buyer b′.
Then, b has his three options: leave, stay or choose b′, and so on.
All this is common knowledge among b′, s′ and b. Note that there is always some
seller with whom buyer b′ is matched: even if b′ has left his partner in the last period,
he is matched again with probability 1. Figure 3.2 depicts the situation.
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Figure 3.2: Competing for Sellers
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Strategies and Information:
Apart from information leakage, traders do not observe what happens in matches
in which they are not involved. For example, while b and s are matched, s learns
nothing about the trading history of previous matches of buyer b. As already noted
traders in any given relation do not use any information obtained through information
leakage in any previous match. However, b and s learn each period the trading history
of buyer b′. In each period in which he has a partner each agent only observes the
price proposed, the response to this price, the information transmitted by information
leakage and the decision of the buyer whether to return to the pool, to look for a
new trading partner or to stay with his current partner. Traders do not observe the
identities of their trading partners.
Let b(t) denote the buyer with whom a given seller is matched in period t and
define s(t) similarly. A seller’s private bargaining history is
Hs(t) = {ps(1), rb(1)(1), αb(1)(1), Ib(1)s(t), ..., ps(t−1), rb(t−1)(t−1), αb(t−1)(t−1), Ib(t−1)s(t−1)}
(3.15)
and a buyer’s private bargaining history is
Hb(t) = {ps(1)(1), rb(1), αb(1), Ibs(1)(1), ..., ps(t− 1), rb(t− 1), αb(t− 1), Ibs(t−1)(t− 1)}.
(3.16)
Buyer b’s acceptance decision is given by
rb(t) : Hb(t)× R −→ {Y,N} (3.17)
and the outside option strategy for b is given by
αb(t) : Hb(t)× R× {Y,N} −→ {b′, pool, stay}. (3.18)
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A buyer’s strategy set is given by
Σb = {rb(t) : Hb(t)× R→ {Y,N}} × {αb(t) : Hb(t)× R× {Y,N} → {b′, pool, stay}}.
(3.19)
The formal description of a strategy for the seller is given by
ps(t) : Hs(t) −→ R. (3.20)
Again, I impose the stationarity assumption 2 on the sellers’ strategies. Denote
the set of strategies for a seller as
Σs = {ps(t) : Hs(t) −→ R} (3.21)
The Effect of Buyer Competition:
I shall now explain how buyer competition affects the bargaining outcome. Sup-
pose that buyers want to sustain a target price sequence {pE(t)}∞t=1 := {p◦(t)}∞t=1. A
deviation occurs if a seller proposes a price p(t) > p◦(t) which is accepted by his trading
partner. If buyer b deviates, I construct a punishment such that buyer b has to pay the
high period 1 price for all future periods to his current trading partner, say s, whom he
does not leave. If he should try to avoid the punishment by returning to the matching
pool, the other buyer b′ visits any new trading partner of buyer b in any future period.
This induces competition among the two buyers. Competition allows any seller to pro-
pose a price of 1 to b and to start a new relation with b′ if b should reject the proposal.
The deviant buyer b rejects this price of 1 and misses the trading opportunity and looks
for a new partner each period. The threat of competition prevents b from looking for a
new, unmatched trading partner and b accepts willingly his punishment from s. Since
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the punishment constructed through competition is more severe than the most severe
punishment in section 3.3, buyers can extract a higher surplus for any discount factor.
Lemma 1. For a decreasing target price sequence {pE(t)}∞t=1 := {p◦(t)}∞t=1 there ex-
ist equilibrium strategies such that {p◦(t)}∞t=1 is supported in an equilibrium through
{pD(t)}∞t=τ+1 = p◦(1), for δb large enough.
Proof. Each equilibrium strategy is described as a collection of states and rules of
transition between them. Most of the states are defined for any trading pair (bs). One
state has to be defined for the situation when a buyer, say b′, competes for the seller s
who is matched with buyer b. The equilibrium strategies and the states are described
in Table 3.1. Transition rules are given in Table 3.2.
The state E(bs) dictates traders’ behavior for any (bs) as long as b does not
deviate. The state P(bs) dictates traders’ behavior for any (bs) if b did deviate. The
state A(bs) is an intermediate state in which play only rests for one period. It triggers
competition among buyers: play switches to this state only if b′ is in a punishment
phase (state P(b′s′)) and chooses ”leave”. Play leaves state A(bs) in any case after one
period. The state B(bsb′) denotes the situation in which buyer b has deviated, left his
previous trading partner, is matched to seller s and where buyer b′ competes for seller
s. All states are defined for any buyer b, any seller s, any pair (bs) and for any triple
(bsb′).
Not all transitions from the state B(bsb′) are described since there are numerous
possibilities.
Two points are critical for sequential rationality and must be dealt with:
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Strategies/States E(bs) P(bs) A(bs) B(bsb′)
s proposes p◦(t) p◦(1) - p = 1 to b, p◦(1) to b′
b accepts p ≤ p◦(t) p ≤ p◦(1) - nothing
b’s action αb(t) stay stay b
′ -
Table 3.1: Equilibrium strategies
switch from to if
E(bs) P(bs) b accepts p(t) > p
◦(t)
E(bs) A(bs)
if b′ is in a punishment phase (state
P(b′s′)) and chooses ”leave”
E(bs) E(bs) otherwise
P(bs) P(bs) forever (absorbing)
A(bs) ”restart” E(bs)
If b is supposed to compete for the
seller of b′ but did not leave his cur-
rent partner s.
A(bs) B(b′s′b) otherwise
B(b′s′b) E(b′s′) if b
′ accepts the first proposal from s′
B(b′s′b) E(bs′) otherwise
Table 3.2: Transition Rules
(i) Buyer b, after having defected, tries to avoid his punishment by running away
from seller s.
(ii) Buyer b′, having observed the deviation of buyer b does not want to participate
in the punishment of buyer b.
The above described strategies circumvent these problems:
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(i) The prescribed strategies are sequentially rational. If b tries to avoid his
punishment he finds a new partner and trades for the price of p◦(1) for one period
with, say, seller s′. But since his decision to go back to the pool is noticed by buyer
b′, buyer b′ competes then for the new seller of b for the next period and is willing to
start a new relationship. Knowing this, seller s′ demands a price of one from b. This
causes b to take his outside option and to leave s′ the period before (after trade with s
has occurred at the price p◦(1)). But this happens in all future periods: b always has
to pay the price p◦(1) if he leaves s; buyer b′ does not allow him to get to low price
periods. Since according to the proposed equilibrium strategies b has to pay p◦(1) in
his relationship with s, a deviation, that is, leaving s, is not profitable for δb sufficiently
large.
(ii) To make sure that buyer b′ does actually play his role in the punishment
of defector b, I require that the equilibrium price sequence p◦(t) gets restarted in the
relation (b′s′) whenever b′ does not follow his prescribed strategy. If b′ leaves his partner
and competes for the new seller s of b, he will be the new trading partner of s since
seller s makes his ”old” buyer b a price offer of one which this buyer rejects. Since b′
will be the new trading partner of s and since this is a new relation (b′s) start with the
high first period price and lower prices follow. According to the equilibrium strategies
it is not a profitable deviation for b′ to stay with his old partner. It is also not profitable
for b′ to return to the matching pool since there he has to start a new relationship as
well with a decreasing price sequence.
It is easy to check that the proposed strategies satisfy all other equilibrium con-
ditions, too.
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Proposition 7. There exists a target price sequence {p◦(t)}∞t=1 such that
U(p◦(t)) > U∗(p∗(t)) for all δb ∈ (0, 1)
in equilibrium.
Proof. Let p◦(1) > 0 and p◦(t) = 0 for all t = 2, 3, .... Fix δb. I determine p◦(1). By
Lemma 1, the incentive constraint for a buyer if a seller proposes a price p(t) > p◦(t)
in excess of p◦(t) is given by
0 +
δb
1− δb ≥ (1− p(t)) +
δb(1− p◦(1))
1− δb for all p(t) (3.22)
for period 1. Since this constraint has to hold for all p(t) it certainly has to hold for
p(t) = p◦(t). Solving for p◦(1), I obtain p◦(1) ≥ (1− δb)/δb. The incentive constraints
for periods t = 2, 3, ... are given by
0 +
δb
1− δb ≥ (1− p(t)) +
δb(1− p◦(1))
1− δb . (3.23)
for all p(t). In these cases, I set p(t) = 0. Solving then for p◦(1), I obtain p◦(1) ≥
(1− δb). To satisfy both incentive constraints, p◦(1) ≥ (1− δb)/δb has to hold. Since I
want to determine the maximal utility buyers can achieve, I let p◦(1) = (1− δb)/δb.
If p◦(1) = (1− δb)/δb, then
U(p◦(t)) =
(2δb − 1)(1− δb) + δ2b
δb(1− δb) >
2δb − 1
δb(1− δb) = U
∗(p∗(t))
for all δb ∈ (0, 1).
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Proposition 8. Maximum utility for buyers in a collusive equilibrium is given by
U(p◦(t)) =
(2δb − 1)(1− δb) + δ2b
δb(1− δb) .
The optimal equilibrium price sequence that implements this utility level is given by
p◦(1) =
1− δb
δb
, p◦(2) = p◦(3) = ... = 0.
Proof. I only need to show that there exists no other equilibrium price sequence
{pa(t)}∞t=1 which yields buyers a higher utility given the available punishments. So
suppose that {p◦(t)}∞t=1 is an equilibrium price sequence and that there exists another
equilibrium price sequence {pa(t)}∞t=1 with pa(1) < p◦(1) and pa(t) > 0 for at least one
t ≥ 2. Suppose that U(pa(t)) > U◦(p◦(t)).
Since {p◦(t)}∞t=1 is an equilibrium price sequence, by Lemma 1 the following in-
centive constraint holds for the buyers in period t = 1 if a seller proposes a price higher
than p◦(1) :
0 +
δb
1− δb ≥ (1− p
◦(1)) + δb
[
1
1− δb
(
1− 1− δb
δb
)]
. (3.24)
Choose p◦(1) such that this incentive constraint holds with equality.
The appropriate incentive constraint in t = 1 for the alternative equilibrium price
sequence {pa(t)}∞t=1 is
0 + δbU
a
c ≥ (1− pa(1)) + δb
[
1
1− δb
(
1− 1− δb
δb
)]
, (3.25)
where Uac is the equilibrium continuation payoff from period 2 on for the equilib-
rium price sequence {pa(t)}∞t=1. But if pa(1) < p◦(1), the last constraint cannot hold:
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since equation (3.24) holds with equality, the LHS (RHS) of (3.25) is smaller (larger)
than the LHS of (3.24). Hence the price sequence {pa(t)}∞t=1 cannot be an equilibrium
price sequence.
The optimal equilibrium price sequence has a positive first period price and is
zero thereafter. For the closed form solution for p◦(1), consult the proof of Proposition
7.
Let us discuss the role of the various assumptions play for the results of this
paper: in section 3, the assumption that traders do not use any information about a
new trading partner’s history and the assumption that buyers can look for alternative
trading partners reduce the surplus a buyer is able to extract - as compared to the
situation of a bilateral monopoly.
In the present section, both information of, say, (bs) about the history of b′ and the
strategic option which creates competition among the buyers offset the negative effect
which the outside option induces. It is important to note that without the possibility
of competition all results from section 3 continue to hold even under the assumption
that traders can observe events in other relations! This comes from the stationarity
assumption for sellers’ strategies, assumption 2. If traders had only information about
the other buyer’s history, a buyer still could avoid a harsh punishment by running away
and looking for a new, unmatched trading partner who has no information about the
buyer’s history. The start of a new relation of the deviant buyer would be observed,
but not be punished!
It is hence the additional strategic option for competition which increases a
buyer’s surplus in section 4. While the strategic option to look for a new trading
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partner reduces the buyers’ surplus, the option to look for a new trading partner who
is currently matched - competition - increases the surplus again.
While all results from sections 2 and 3 can be obtained for one buyer, the result
of section 4 relies on the presence of more than one buyer! To understand more the role
of the presence of another buyer in providing punishments, it is helpful to compare the
present work to the literature on norm enforcement in games with large populations
(see Kandori [34] and Ellison [21]). This literature focuses on the enforcement of
norms in situations of common interest among all agents, for example cooperation in
a Prisoner’s Dilemma. In common interest situations, all agents may contribute to the
most severe punishment for an agent who deviates from the norm. In my model, the
situation is not one of common interest: buyers try to sustain a norm which is not in
the interest of sellers. Still sellers help in sustaining a good equilibrium for the buyers
by providing punishments. This comes out most clearly in the bilateral monopoly case:
whenever a buyer accepts a price higher than the target price he is punished by the
stage game equilibrium with the seller proposing a price of one for all future periods.
This sort of punishment does not seem to have a natural interpretation and has the
feature that sellers even prefer to be in a punishment stage. But the sellers’ possible
help as punishers is reduced if they cannot condition their behavior on information
about a new trading partner. In that situation buyers can achieve better equilibria
- even with full information flow - only if other buyers contribute to a more severe
punishment, if ”competitors are friends”.
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3.5 Relation to the Bargaining Literature
In Vincent [54], buyers make sequential offers to a single seller. The first buyer makes
an offer which, if it is accepted, ends the game. If not, the second buyer gets to
make an offer and so on. All agents observe all events in the market. Note that a
single buyer could extract all the surplus given that he makes the offer. Vincent shows
that the presence of many buyers still allows the buyers to extract some surplus: each
buyer proposes a price of zero and the seller gives the good to each buyer with equal
probability. This equilibrium is sustained by the threat of competition: if one buyer
proposes a price higher than zero, the seller rejects this offer and the next buyer(s)
makes a much higher offer which the seller then accepts. Hence, buyer competition is
not necessarily disadvantageous for the buyers. In contrast, I show that the presence
of other buyers is actually needed if individual bargaining power is reduced by the lack
of credible commitment to ”accept” punishments. Moreover, since I model a market
with repeated one-shot transactions I can explicitly study the trade-off between a
”realized” short term gain and the long term loss of a deviation as it is known from
other infinitely repeated games. Finally, sellers and buyers cannot be integrated that
easily in a punishment system as in Vincent’s paper since each agent possesses only
information about his private bargaining history. Due to the stationarity assumptions
sellers are not able to reconstruct a buyer’s bargaining history.
Since the paper by Vincent is closely related to the paper by Rubinstein and
Wolinsky [50], most of these comments apply also to the paper by Rubinstein and
Wolinsky. Rubinstein and Wolinsky study a random matching model where the pro-
poser in a simple ultimatum bargaining game is selected randomly. If two agents agree
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on a price, they trade and depart from the market. If they don’t agree they leave
and get matched anew. Rubinstein and Wolinsky have two cases under which buyers
can extract all the surplus (in the case without discounting). In the first case, agents
observe the full history of the whole game and sellers observe buyers’ identities. In the
second case, each agent only observes his private history but sellers still do observe the
buyers’ identities. My informational assumptions reduce each seller’s role in providing
”punishments” for a defecting buyer. This enables me to highlight the role of buyer
competition. The presence of other buyers matters since they have to be integrated in
the system of punishment strategies.
3.6 Conclusion
I presented a model of bilateral oligopoly with bilateral negotiations, random matching
and an option to continue trade. The model allowed me to study the effects of compe-
tition in a bilateral oligopoly which is characterized by such features. Increased seller
competition turns out to be detrimental for buyers if sellers do not observe a buyer’s
private bargaining history. Buyer competition mitigates this negative effect induced
by the outside option since buyer competition limits the value of the outside option by
punishing buyers who use that option.
The main result of this chapter is that the presence of competitors may be useful
while the presence of more agents on the other side of the market is not. The effect
of competition to sustain favorable equilibria is well known from infinitely repeated
Cournot or Bertrand games. I argue that implicit collusion as suggested by these mod-
els also can be modeled in a market with bilateral negotiations. The role of competition,
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however, is a different one. In the Cournot and in the Bertrand model, the problem
is that competition on the same side of the market might cause a problem in the first
place. The problem for any buyer in the model this chapter is that competition on the
other side of the market reduces his surplus by introducing an outside option. Buyers’
competition limits the value of the outside option for each buyer.
Repeated game models usually are plagued by a multiplicity of equilibria. I fo-
cused on equilibria which seem to be natural. In particular, the equilibria which model
implicit buyer collusion in section 4 are interesting since they model an institution
which we also observe in real world economies. Still, there are other equilibria and
any equilibrium is associated with a certain distribution of surplus between buyers and
sellers. However, in real life markets we do not observe any distribution of surplus
in bilateral oligopolies. In a given market, one or the other side is the dominant side
of the market and is able to dictate the terms of trade. In other words: it would be
interesting to have a model which explains endogenously which side of such a market
obtains a higher surplus. Such a model would necessarily have to narrow the set of
equilibria in such a repeated game model. To do so, there have to be restrictions on the
strategies players use in equilibrium. To find reasonable restrictions on strategies one
could look at institutional details and certain competition policy aspects. One could
think, for example, of a model where competition policy is modeled as a player who is
able to exclude certain strategies for one side of the market or the other. This in turn
would influence the distribution of surplus in the market.
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Chapter 4
Communication Networks and
Cooperation
4.1 Introduction
Network based mechanisms are important institutions for the enforcement of trust and
cooperative behavior in communities. The mechanisms work through communication
and fear of punishment for misbehavior or through anticipation of rewards in case of
good behavior. For example, ethnic communities such as the Dominicans in New York
and the Cubans in Miami use such systems to sustain informal credit channels (see
Portes and Sensenbrenner [46]). The well known rotating credit associations among
Asian immigrants, for example the Chinese on Java, rely on trust enforcement through
network mechanisms as well (see Granovetter [28]).
In such a network, information, judgements, gossip and so on are exchanged only
among close friends. The number of close friends network members have among each
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other is hence an important input to foster cooperation. A dense network, that is, a
network where each network member has many close ties seems beneficial since each
network member may use these ties as an effective threat to enforce cooperative behav-
ior. It is less clear what the costs of a dense network are. For example, an exacerbation
of the obligations within a network can conspire exactly against the network. Portes
and Sensenbrenner display interesting examples like faulty assaults or constraints on
freedom. Boissevain [11] studies the structure of relations inhabitants of Malta have.
He shows with an example of two inhabitants that people generally do not maintain
close ties to all members in their network. What is then the optimal number of con-
tacts or close friends for each network member, and what might constrain the number
of close friends in one’s network?
Another important dimension with direct consequences for economic behavior is
the network size, that is, the overall number of participants in a network. Granovetter
[28] notes the success of the overseas Chinese on Java, which is based on rotating credit
associations. The Javanese failed in establishing such a mechanism. Being immigrants,
the Chinese are a small community in relation to the Javanese: in a Javanese town
dubbed ”Modjokuto” they numbered 1.800 out of a total of approximately 18.000.
Granovetter offers the following explanation. Successful Javanese face demands for a
piece of the cake achieved from an unlimited number of other Javanese (relatives, kins,
etc.). The Chinese immigrants did not suffer from such excessive claims, since their
immigrant status simplified the process of ”decoupling” from relatives and kins. This
chapter suggests that there is an additional detrimental effect of large numbers. On
the one hand, cooperating network members benefit from a large number of network
members since it is more likely that they interact with other cooperating network
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members. On the other hand, large communities are plagued by gossip which makes
monitoring more difficult. In particular, the number of close friends which is required
to sustain cooperation can then be prohibitively high.
This chapter addresses these two issues in the setting of a repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma with changing partners. In a world with noisy communication I show that it
is in general not socially optimal to have close contacts to all other network members.
However, private incentives differ and network members choose to have close contacts to
all other network members. Moreover, as the size of the network gets large, cooperation
fails; if network formation is costly, no network sustaining cooperation might form at
all.
The basic framework is that of a repeated game with changing partners a` la Kan-
dori [34]. Before the repeated interaction starts, a subset of all agents form a network
and each network member chooses a number of other network members - close con-
tacts - to whom he communicates the events in each of his per-period interactions. If
communication is frictionless harshest punishments are achieved by choosing as many
contacts as possible. Moreover, it is optimal to have as many network members as
possible. If communication is noisy, it is no longer socially optimal to have a maximum
number of contacts possible. The reason is that noisy communication might lead to
sanctions with positive probability although there was no misbehavior. This lowers the
overall benefit from cooperation if the number of contacts is too large. The message
is that communication and information flow among all members is not socially opti-
mal. However, private incentives to maintain close contacts might significantly differ
from social incentives, so that an overinvestment in relations may occur. The noise in
communication may be interpreted as noise in the technology which is used to trans-
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mit information. Another interpretation is that each agent, with positive probability,
mistakenly reports as compared what actually happened.
In a community there is not only communication among close friends, but also
communication among all network members. Hence, individuals receive messages with
some informational content from their close friends while they receive pure noisy mes-
sages - gossip - from all other network members. Then, as the number of network mem-
bers gets large, cooperation cannot be sustained anymore. Intuitively, if the number of
network members gets large, agents cannot distinguish between gossip information and
truthful information; cooperation fails. If network formation were costly no network
would form! The finding suggests also why in many communities we do not observe
communication networks but other, more centralized institutions, such as courts which
rely not only on communication as a means of investigation.
Milgrom, North and Weingast [41] model the role of courts in enforcing cooper-
ation in a basic setting similar to the one in this chapter. In their paper, agents may
inform a court about a partner’s misbehavior and they also may obtain information
about a partner’s previous behavior from the court. Hence information flows through
a central institution whereas here information flows are decentralized. Greif’s [30]
remarkable work on the Maghribi trader’s coalition studies an efficiency wage based
mechanism which the Maghribi used to enforce honest behavior from their agents. A
wage which has to be paid to enforce honest behavior is decreasing in the probability
of future hiring. Hence a merchant prefers to hire an honest agent. Such a mechanism
also rests on the assumption of information flow among the Maghribis. In contrast to
the present work, Greif does not model the details of the communication network. An-
other paper which explicitly models network benefits from a communication network
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is Boorman’s [12] analysis on the impact of communication networks on job search.
There is a also growing literature on strategic noncooperative network formation
which focusses on individual incentives to form links, e.g. Bala and Goyal [7] or Jackson
and Wolinsky [33].1 Bala and Goyal interpret their model as a model of information
flow. An agent’s benefits and costs in a network in their paper is given by the number of
agents he is linked to. The authors show that specific network architectures, e.g. a star
or a ring, emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a strategic game of link formation. I contrast
to Bala and Goyal I do not study the pattern of a network but examine the number
of links or contacts agent must have to sustain cooperation. Benefits and cost from a
contact are determined directly from the repeated interaction that follows the stage of
contact formation. In particular, I model costs from network formation endogenous:
the same mechanism which supports cooperation through communication in the first
place might be detrimental to the community if communication in the network is noisy.
The aspect that frictions are present in networks is missing in most of the literature
mentioned (section 5 in Bala and Goyal [7] is a notable exception).
Kranton and Minehart [35] also analyze patterns of strategic network formation.
Network benefits are given by an economic environment of trade among buyers and
sellers. Buyers must form links to sellers before they can buy one unit of a good. After
the stage of link formation an efficient trading mechanisms (e.g. a generalization of an
ascending-bid auction) allocates the goods among the buyers. Kranton and Minehart
show that the efficient network structure, i.e. a network structure which maximize
overall surplus, is always an equilibrium. In contrast, I show that if communication is
1See Aumann and Myerson [5] and van den Nouweland [43] for approaches using cooperative game
theory.
79
noisy, private and social incentives for network formation differ.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 sets up the model.
Conditions for a network equilibrium without noise are derived in section 4.3. Section
4.4 contains the result on the optimal number of contacts with noise, while section
4.5 presents the result on cooperation failure when the number of network members
gets large. Section 4.6 discusses how the results of the model are affected if certain
assumptions are changed and section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 The Model
I shall first describe the situation without communication network. There are i =
1, ..., I > 2 agents, where I is even. The number i ∈ {1, ..., I} is also called the identity
of agent i. Time is discrete, t = 1, 2, ..., and runs from one to infinity. In each period,
all agents get matched pairwise. If a match forms, the two agents play the following
stage game.
C D
C a, a b, c
D c, b 0, 0
with c > a > 0 > b.
Each agent only observes his private history but does not observe the events in
other matches. For each agent, a strategy is a function from his private history to
his action set. Each agent maximizes his average discounted payoff. Let δ ∈ (0, 1)
denote the discount factor for all agents. This setting is equivalent to those studied
80
by Kandori [34] or Ellison [21]. Whereas Kandori and Ellison sustain cooperation
through punishments relying on contagion effects coming back to hit a noncooperator,
I shall consider a more direct punishment mechanism.2 This more direct punishment
mechanism comes from a communication network.
The Game with Communication Network
Suppose that N ≤ I agents have decided to set up a communication network.
The game looks then as follows.
(N1) all agents inside the network know and recognize the identities of other network
members. Let N denote the set of network members.
(N2) in period 0 - before the repeated interaction starts - all network members choose
simultaneously Li ≤ N − 1 contacts or close friends. Let Li denote the set of
contacts of agent i. These contacts will sometimes be called outgoing contacts.
We say that i has a contact to j if j ∈ Li. Let Li be the set of agents who have
a contact to i, that is Li = {j ∈ N , j 6= i|i ∈ Lj}. Let Li denote the number of
network members who have a contact to i, that is, Li = #Li. These contacts will
sometimes be called incoming contacts. A network L is defined as the pattern of
contacts agents have among each other. Each network L implies, for each network
member i, a number of contacts i has to other agents, Li, and a number of contacts
other agents have to i, Li. Let LN(L) ∈ RN×2, LN = {(L1, L1), ..., (LN , LN)} be
the matrix of these numbers. For the rest of the paper only these numbers, not
the exact pattern of contacts of agents, are relevant and I write LN .
3 Agents
2I shall explain the relation of this chapter to their papers in more detail below.
3Hence two networks L and L′ are equivalent if LN (L) = LN (L′)
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who are not network members cannot choose contacts.
(N3) Relations among agents are not symmetric, that is j ∈ Li ; i ∈ Lj for all
i, j ∈ N . Hence, for agents i ∈ N and j ∈ N , i has a contact to j and j has a
contact to i if and only if j ∈ Li and i ∈ Lj. Moreover, relations among agents
are not transitive, that is, i ∈ Lj ∧ z ∈ Li ; z ∈ Lj for all i, j, z ∈ N .
(N4) The repeated interaction itself is as follows: in any period t = 1, 2, ..., agents get
matched pairwise. All agents can get matched both with agents in the network
and with agents outside the network. If two network members i and j meet they
observe the number of contacts Li and Lj of their partner and then choose their
action, C or D.
(N5) after network members i and j have played the stage game, both i and j inform
their respective contacts (Li contacts for i and Lj contacts for j) of their partners’
actions in the match. Hence the information of i given to his Li contacts contains
an element of the set {C,D} and the identity (i.e. a number i ∈ {1, ..., I}) of
his partner. This information about i is available to the Lj contacts of j at the
beginning of the next period.
Assumptions (N1)-(N5) define a game with communication network.
Equilibrium Strategies in the Repeated Game:
In the repeated game with network formation, strategies for a network member i
are now functions from private histories and from the information i receives from the
Li agents who chose to have contacts to i in period 0. For the periods t = 1, 2, ...,
that is, for the infinitely repeated interaction following any choice of a communication
network L, I consider equilibria involving the following strategies:
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(E1) agents outside the network choose D in each period.
(E2) agents inside the network choose C if they have the information that their partner
has always chosen C. If there is no information since the partner is not a network
member an agent chooses D.
(E3) agents inside the network chooseD if they have the information that their partner
has chosen D in any previous period. An agent who has chosen D meeting an
agent who plays C chooses D forever after.
(E4) if a network member i deviated in a match with network member j, then j informs
all his Lj contacts about this. That is, he sends the message D and i’s identity
to all his Lj contacts. Agent i sends the message C and the identity of j. From
the next period on those Lj contacts punish i forever after. If both i and j chose
C, then both agents send the message C to their respective contacts.
(E5) once punishment for an agent i takes place, i sends the message C to all his Li
contacts for the rest of the game.
To understand (E5), suppose that network member i did not cooperate when
playing with network member j and that j informs all his Lj contacts about this.
Assumption (E5) says that noncooperator i does not trigger punishments on his pun-
ishers by informing his Li contacts. The assumption assures that punishing is always
a best response in the equilibrium described for the punishers. If assumption (E5)
does not hold, an agent who is required to punish another agent might fear further
punishment and chooses C when he is supposed to choose D. As in Kandori [34] one
could circumvent the problem and fix stage game payoffs such that punishing is a best
response (i.e. b has to be sufficiently small). Then, all the qualitative results of the
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paper continue to hold even if (E5) is not imposed. I chose to impose assumption (E5)
since, in contrast to Kandori’s analysis I do not want to focus on contagion effects. I
discuss the implications of relaxing (E5) for the results of this paper in more detail in
section 4.6.
The equilibrium strategies (E1) to (E4) are considered since they seem natural in
a communication network I have in mind. Network members inform their close contacts
about any network member choosing D. This noncooperator is then punished by the
close friends of the agent who was cheated. The strategies resemble in a simple way
the communication network mechanisms used by ethnic communities as mentioned in
the introduction.
Let σn denote the strategy profile for network member described above while σ−n
denotes the strategy profile for all agents not in the network. The strategy profile for
all agents is denoted by σ. The payoff V ni (σ) for a network member, is
V ni (σ) =
N − 1
I − 1 a (4.1)
The average expected payoff Vi(σ) for an agent not in the network is Vi(σ) = 0.
I take a network with N members as given and ask wether network members
are willing to participate. A network of size N is beneficial if and only if all network
members are willing to participate. This participation constrained is required to hold
for all histories of play. Hence, to have a network which is beneficial to all participants,
V ni (σ) ≥ 0 has to hold for all histories of play. Note that this participation constraint
is satisfied for any network size N . If the payoff from both partners playing D is
d > 0, c > a > d > b, then N has to be sufficiently large. If there is some exogenous
cost for network formation, for example, if it is costly to maintain contacts, then V ni (σ)
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has to exceed this cost as well.
4.3 Equilibrium and Choice of Contacts
In this section I analyze if and under what conditions the strategies specified in (E1)
to (E5) form an equilibrium indeed. Moreover, I determine the number of contacts
agents choose in period 0.
I shall first show the optimality of (E4) and (E5).
Lemma 2. For any L, information transmission as specified in (E4) and (E5) is always
optimal.
Proof. (E4). Suppose that agents behave according to (E5). Pick agent i ∈ N . Sup-
pose that in a match with i agent j plays C. If agent i informs his Li contacts that
j played D, they punish j forever after, which does not increase i′s payoff. Suppose
that j played D. If agent i does not inform his contacts about this, his payoff does not
increase either (due to (E5)) . Moreover, any information of i about some other agent
z 6= j would not increase i′s payoff either.
(E5). With a similar argument, a noncooperator j cannot increase his payoff
sending the message D instead of the message C.
Given this lemma, punishing a noncooperator is an equilibrium in the continua-
tion game after any defection, as required in (E3).
To have network members cooperate as required in (E2), the following incentive
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constraint has to hold for all i ∈ N :
N − 1
I − 1 a ≥
N − 1
I − 1 c+
δ
1− δ
(
N − Lj − 1
I − 1 a
)
(4.2)
for all j ∈ Lj.
The benefit of cooperation is given by the probability of meeting a network mem-
ber, (N − 1))/(I − 1) times the payoff of cooperation, a. The benefit from defection
is the defection payoff c and the continuation payoff. The continuation payoff from
defection is zero with probability Lj/(I − 1) and with probability (I −N)/(I − 1) and
a with probability (N −Lj − 1)/(I − 1). Due to Lemma 1 it is always a best response
for j′s Lj contacts to punish i.
Solving inequality (4.2) yields
Lj ≥ L◦ = (N − 1)(1− δ)(c− a)
δa
(4.3)
as the minimum number of contacts each network members needs to have in order to
sustain cooperation.4 Thus it is not necessary that all network members have contacts
to all other network members. Behavior as specified in (E1) is clearly optimal. Last
note that V ni (σ) ≥ 0 holds for all histories of play.
To determine the number of contacts agents choose in period 0, I focus on network
members’ equilibrium choices which induce the maximal threat on their partner.
(E6) network members choose a number of contacts such that their partners payoff is
lowest in case of noncooperation.
Contact choices induce extremal equilibria in the sense of Abreu, [3] or [1]. Hence,
it is optimal for each agent during the stage of contact formation that every agent
4This number is actually [L◦] + 1, where [x] denotes the next largest integer to x.
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chooses Li = N − 1. This number of links provides the harshest punishment for a
noncooperator.
If the communication network L is organized such that it maximizes each network
member’s utility, it is also an optimal strategy that all network members have Li =
N − 1 contacts. This implies also that each network member is contacted by all other
network members, Li = N − 1. Hence network members’ private incentives and social
incentives for the network as a whole are the same! Efficient communication network
formation is always an equilibrium on the game of network in stage 0, given repeated
interaction from period 1 on.
Considering network size, note that equilibrium payoffs are increasing in N so
that agents prefer large networks. If c > a/(1 − δ), the number of contacts required
to sustain cooperation would strictly exceed N − 1; cooperation based on a network
mechanism fails in that case. The following Proposition summarizes these observations.
Proposition 9. Suppose that (E1) to (E6) hold in the game with communication net-
work.
(i) Cooperation is sustainable in the network if and only if
Li ≥ (N − 1)(1− δ)(c− a)
δa
for all i ∈ N .
(ii) Suppose that contact choices induce extremal equilibria. For all N∗ ≥ 2, it is
then optimal to form a network in which each network member chooses Li =
N − 1 contacts. Then punishment is maximal and cooperation in the network
can be sustained for δ ≥ (c − a)/c. The choice of Li = N − 1 is optimal for
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each individual network member and also optimal if the network maximizes each
network member’s utility: efficient communication network formation is always
an equilibrium.
(iii) Since equilibrium payoffs for network members are strictly increasing in N , it is
optimal to have all agents in the network, that is N = I is optimal.
(iv) If c > a/(1− δ) it is not possible to sustain cooperation.
4.3.1 Cooperation without Institutions ?
In Kandori [34] and Ellison [21] cooperation is sustained by punishments relying on
contagion effects coming back to hit a noncooperator. In such a contagion equilibrium,
all agent initially cooperate. If an agent ever meets an opponent who defects, he defects
from then on. Hence, playing D today will eventually lead all agents to play D. If
these strategies are an equilibrium depends on how fast contagion spreads, which in turn
depends on the number of agents and on the stage game payoffs. The main problem is
that agents prefer to continue choosing C even after meeting an agent who plays D in
order to slow down the spread of contagion. In particular, Kandori shows that, for any
fixed number of agents, the contagion strategies are an equilibrium for discount factors
close to 1 if stage game payoffs are such that the payoff to playing C against an agent
playing D is sufficiently negative. Ellison extends Kandori’s work and assumes that a
publicly observable random variable is available. The public randomization allows to
adjust the severity of the punishments. Punishments can be tailored such that agents
fear a breakdown of cooperation, so they do no deviate first. Moreover, they do not
fear the breakdown so much that they do not spread out the play of D.
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In those papers cooperation is possible without any institutions. However, we do
observe communication networks (see the introduction of this paper)! A reason for this
could be that the direct punishments in this chapter work for discount factors smaller
than the discount factor required to sustain Kandori’s or Ellison’s mechanism.
Proposition 10. The discount factor necessary to sustain cooperation through network
formation is smaller than the discount factor necessary to sustain cooperation through
contagion.
Proof. Cooperation through contagion requires a larger discount factor than coopera-
tion through network formation if a noncooperator’s continuation payoff after defection
is larger.
With network formation, a noncooperator is punished immediately forever after
a deviation. Hence, a noncooperator’s continuation payoff after a deviation is zero.
In punishments relying on a contagion effects and it lasts at least (I−2)/2 periods
until a noncooperator is punished with probability 1 in every period. Hence, in the first
(I − 2)/2 periods after a deviation there is always a strictly positive probability that
a noncooperator is not punished. This implies that the infimum of a noncooperator’s
continuation payoff is strictly bounded away from zero.
Hence this more effective way of punishment might be a reason why we observe
institution such as communication networks or courts (see Milgrom, Weingast and
North [41]).
89
4.4 Noisy Communication
In the previous section it was optimal for each agent to choose as many contacts as
possible. This choice was optimal since contacts never became active in equilibrium.
A large number of contacts is a very effective threat! However, in many networks, the
same mechanism which supports cooperative actions may also be detrimental to the
agents in the network. In particular, if communication is noisy, those contacts might
not cooperate with me although I myself did cooperate. It may then be optimal if my
partner has fewer than N − 1 contacts. Moreover, it could be that I have to punish
other network members even though they did cooperate. Hence, I prefer that Li, the
number of other network members who have a contact to me, is not too high. I shall
analyze the socially optimal choice of a communication network L when there is noise
in the transmission of information.
4.4.1 Noise and Equilibrium Restrictions
I model the presence of noise as follows. Suppose that there is noise in the stage of
the game where each agent informs his Li contacts about the behavior of his partner
j in a given period. Two things can happen: the partner j of agent i did deviate, but
none of i′s contacts received the message and all of i′s contacts continue to believe that
j did cooperate. Or, j did not deviate, but the Li contacts of agent i did receive the
message that agent j did deviate.
Formally, each message between two agents generates one of two signals at each
period. The signal space is given by X = {C,D} and is the same for all matches. The
signal C is interpreted as a ”good” signal, the signal D is interpreted as a ”bad” signal.
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Let, for all matches between i and j, i, j ∈ N ,
α = Pr(Li contacts receive signal C |j reports C)
1− α = Pr(Li contacts receive signal D |j reports C)
β = Pr(Li contacts receive signal C |j reports D)
1− β = Pr(Li contacts receive signal D |j reports D).
I assume β < α. It is more likely that signal C results if C was reported than if D was
chosen. All contacts of a network member receive the same signal. Each agent receives
Li signals and each agent can identify the network member to whose behavior a given
signal is related. Moreover, after a match between i and j, it is common knowledge
for j and all the network members in the set Li which signal the agents in the set Li
observe. Similarly for i and the network members in the set Lj.
The game is now as follows: assumptions (N1)-(N5) from section 4.2 hold. The
only difference is that information transmission is noisy. For the repeated interaction
in periods t = 1, 2, ..., for any network choice L, I consider the following equilibria.
(E1) agents outside the network choose D in each period
(E2) agents inside the network start the repeated interaction by playing C. An agent
inside the network continues to choose C if he receives the signal C about the
previous behavior of his new partner. If an agent does not receive any signal
about his new partner, he chooses D.
(E3) if an agent i receives a signal D about the previous behavior of an agent j, then
agent j is punished by i. The punishment of i lasts forever after a deviation, that
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is, all agents who receive signal D about j punish j whenever they meet j.
(E4) information transmission: if in a match between i and j both agents choose C,
then both agents send the message C to their respective contacts. If i deviates
while j plays C then i sends the message C while j sends D. Once punishment
for an agent i takes place, i sends the message C to all his Li contacts for the
rest of the game. Messages produce signals according to the signal technology
described afore.
(E5) equilibrium strategies for all network members are symmetric, that is, all agents
use the same strategies.
Requirement (E4) contains the analogue to assumption (E4) in section 4.2: punish-
ments are not contagious. Moreover, I assume that (E6) from the previous section
holds: agents choose contacts which induce the most severe punishment on their part-
ners. I also assume that all network members choose the same number of contacts,
Li = L for all i ∈ N . In the rest of this section I analyze the conditions for (E1)− (E5)
to be an equilibrium in the repeated game. I also characterize the communication
network L which maximizes the network members’ overall surplus and compare the
result to the communication network L which arises from network members’ private
incentives under assumption (E6).
4.4.2 Analysis of Equilibria with Noisy Communication
In contrast to the previous section, not only the number of contacts each agent i has
is important for the analysis. Since each network member may have to punish other
agents in each period with positive probability, it is also important, how many other
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agents have contacts to agent i. Recall that Li denotes the number of agents in the
network who have contacts to i, that is Li := {# ∪j Lj|i ∈ Lj} where # denotes the
cardinality of the set ∪jLj. Let p(Li) denote the probability that agent i receives a
signal C. Given that these other network members did actually cooperate, p(Li) is a
function of α. The exact expression for p(Li) is complicated and depends on L, that
is, the exact pattern of contact choices in period 0. However, it clearly holds that
p′(Li) < 0 and 0 < p(Li) < 1 for Li > 0. That is, the more other agents chose agent
i as a close friend, the lower the probability that agent i does not have to fulfill any
punishment obligations.
Denote by V +i the payoff from the proposed equilibrium strategy profile. It is
given by
V +i = (1− δ)
N − 1
I − 1 a+ δαp(Li)V
+ + δ(1− α)p(Li)N − Lj − 1
I − 1 a, (4.4)
where Lj are the contacts each partner j ∈ N of i has. Using symmetry, Lj = L for
all j ∈ N , this can be rewritten as
V +i =
[(1− δ)(N − 1) + δp(Li)(1− α)(N − L− 1)]a
(I − 1)(1− δαp(Li))
. (4.5)
It is easy to show that this expression is strictly monotonically decreasing in L and
in Li. The more network members have contacts to i, the more often i has to punish
another network member. The larger the number of contacts i′s partners j 6= i have to
other agents, the more often i is punished. In both cases, an increase in the respective
number of contacts lowers i′ s payoff.
Moreover, the following incentive constraint has to hold to fulfill (E2):
V +i ≥ (1− δ)
N − 1
I − 1 c+ δβp(Li)V
+
i + δ(1− β)p(Li)
N − Lj − 1
I − 1 a. (4.6)
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Note that the probability p(Li) is the same on both sides of that equation: p(Li) denotes
the probability that agent does not have to punish other agents he gets matched to and
thus obtains a positive payoff from the interaction with them. Using the expression for
Vi, we obtain that
L ≥ (N − 1)(c− a)(1− δαp(Li))
(α− β)δap(Li)
(4.7)
has to hold to sustain cooperation, given the stage of contact formation in period
0. Note that L is increasing in Li. The more network members have contacts to i,
the higher is his deviation payoff relative to the payoff from cooperation. Hence a
larger number of contacts outgoing from network members, L, is required. Note that
(E3), (E4) and (E1) are satisfied by the same arguments as in section 4.3.
If the network aims to maximize overall surplus of its members, it maximizes in
the game of contact formation in period 0 each network member’s utility. Since all that
matters are the numbers of ingoing and outgoing contacts LN induced by a network
L, the network maximizes
max
LN
V +i for all i ∈ N subject to (4.7).
We know that the objective function V +i is strictly decreasing in Lj, j 6= i and Li for
all i. On the other hand, the incentive constraint (4.7) has to hold. Suppose, for
simplicity, that the network maximizes overall welfare of its members by choosing LN
such that Li = Lj = L, j 6= i. This means that each network member has the same
number of incoming and outgoing contacts. This is the case, for example, if all network
members have contacts to all other network members. Then, the incentive constraint
reads as
ap(L)L
(1− δαp(L)) ≥
(N − 1)(c− a)
(α− β)δ . (4.8)
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If L = 0, the left-hand side of equation (4.8) is zero, hence there must be a choice of
contacts with L > 0. On the other hand note that the left-hand side of the equation
(4.8) is strictly increasing in L! Hence there exists a unique L∗ with 0 < L∗ < N − 1
such that this incentive constraint is satisfied indeed for any strictly decreasing function
p(L). Moreover, since each network member’s utility is decreasing in L, it is optimal
to choose L∗ as the number of contacts agents have and agents receive.
Proposition 11. Suppose that the network maximizes the surplus of its members by
choosing Li = Li = L for all i.
(i) The strategies (E1)− (E5) form an equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game in
periods t = 1, 2, ... if every agent has L contacts, where L satisfies
ap(L)L(1− δ)
(1− δαp(L)) ≥
(N − 1)(1− δ)(c− a)
(α− β)δ
Punishment is induced by bad signals, D, providing incentives for cooperation
which occurs on good signals, C.
(ii) Equilibrium payoffs are equal to
V +i =
[(1− δ)(N − 1) + δp(L)(1− α)(N − L− 1)]a
(I − 1)(1− δαp(L)) . (4.9)
for all i ∈ N and are monotonically decreasing in L.
(iii) The optimal number of contacts for each network member L∗ is given by the
unique number L∗ that solves
ap(L∗)L∗(1− δ)
(1− δαp(L∗)) =
(N − 1)(1− δ)(c− a)
(α− β)δ . (4.10)
The proposition states that it may well be optimal to restrict the number of
contacts and close contacts each agent has. In particular,
L∗ < N − 1 ⇔ a < (c− a)(1− δαp(N − 1))
p(N − 1)(α− β)δ .
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In that case it is optimal to have fewer than N − 1 contacts in the network.5 As one
easily checks, the following comparative statics results hold.
∂L∗
∂a
< 0,
∂L∗
∂δ
< 0,
∂L∗
∂c
> 0,
∂L∗
∂N
> 0,
∂L∗
∂α
< 0,
∂L∗
∂β
> 0 (4.11)
The optimal number of contacts decreases as α increases (β decreases). The intuition
for this would be that less noise in communication reduces the need for powerful pun-
ishments so less close contacts are necessary to sustain cooperation. On the other hand,
network size N increases, many contacts are needed: as N increases, a noncoopera-
tor finds more easily partners for future cooperation. This increases the incentives to
deviate from the cooperative equilibrium. Then, more contacts are needed to induce
more severe punishment. As the incentives for deviation, c, increases, the number of
contacts must be higher as well.
The private incentives for network formation differ significantly from the social
incentives. It is easy to see that, for each network member, a choice of N − 1 contacts
is again an equilibrium of the network formation game in period 0 if the choice of
contacts is supposed to induce extremal equilibria. This holds since each network
members payoff function V +i does not depend on the number of contacts agent i has to
other agents. The payoff of network member i is decreasing in the number of contacts
other network members have to i and is also decreasing in the number of contacts other
partner have. But the payoff of i does not depend on Li.
5In the language of graph theory, the optimal network is not connected, i.e. there is not a path
between every pair of agents. Connectedness is a standard assumption in much of recent work on social
learning and local interaction; see e.g. Anderlini and Ianni [4], Ellison [20] or Ellison and Fudenberg
[22].
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4.5 Gossip
In the previous section, the distribution of the signal depended only on the outcome
of any given match. In this section I add more noise to the situation and model
network gossip. I assume that each agent is informed about the behavior of a friend’s
partner not only through a more or less informative signal which is generated from any
given match. Rather, each agent receives a noisy message from each other network
member. The interpretation is that even network member who did not observe an
agent’s behavior gossip about what that agent did.
Formally, for any given agent i, the partner matched to i receives now
• one signal about i’s behavior which is informative according to the above defined
probabilities α and β. It still holds that α > β. Suppose for simplicity that α = 1
and β = 0.
• and also signals from all the other N − 2 agents in the network. Those agents
did not observe what i did in the previous period. So, they gossip and transmit
their gossip to the new partner of i: each of the N − 2 signals can be C with
probability γ and D with probability 1− γ. The probability γ is not conditioned
on the action agent i and his partner took in the previous period. An agent does
not know the source of the signal: he does not know if any of the N − 1 signals
is generated by gossip or by the last match of agent i. The signal technology is
hence anonymous in the sense of Green [29].
Hence, each agent receives N − 1 signals about the behavior of his new partner.
Each agent then uses a simple rule to evaluate the N − 1 signals and to condition his
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future actions on the signals.
• If a sufficiently large share K ∈ (0, 1) of the signals is C, an agent cooperates
with his new partner. Otherwise, he chooses action D.
Let |C| denote the number of signals with the value C an agent received about his new
partner and define, for all i, j ∈ N ,
α̂ = Pr(Li contacts receive at least (N − 1) ·K signals C |j reports C)
β̂ = Pr(Li contacts receive at least (N − 1) ·K signals C |j reports D).
I assume α̂ > β̂. It is more likely that signal C results relatively more often if C was
chosen than if D was chosen. All network members receive the same signals. I shall
for further use rewrite these probabilities as
α̂ = Pr(|C|/(N − 1) ≥ K|C)
and
β̂ = Pr(|C|/(N − 1) ≥ K|D).
Since these probabilities are the same for i, j ∈ N , j 6= i, subscripts are omitted.
Basically, we have now a situation similar to the one in section 4.4, but with ”more”
noise.
Given the probabilities α̂ and β̂, one can repeat the exercise from the previous
section and solve for the number of L contacts each agent has. I consider the same
equilibria as in the previous section and impose the same assumptions on contact choice.
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I denote with q(Li) the probability that a network member does receive enough signals
C so that he does not have to punish another network member.
I now analyze the possibilities for network cooperation as N gets large. Recall
that the incentive constraint is given by
L ≥ (N − 1)(c− a)(1− δα̂p(Li))
(α̂− β̂)δap(Li)
(4.12)
for all i ∈ N . This can be rewritten as
(α̂− β̂) ≥ (N − 1)(c− a)(1− δα̂q(Li))
aq(Li)Lδ
. (4.13)
for all i ∈ N . I use this incentive constraint to show that cooperation fails as N gets
large.
Proposition 12. There exists N such that for all N ≥ N cooperation cannot be
sustained.
Proof. Note that
α̂ = Pr(|C|/(N − 1) ≥ K|C) = Pr(|C|/ ≥ K(N − 1)− 1|C).
This follows from the fact that in case of the partner’s action being C, any new partner
of any of the agents involved in the match obtains one signal C for sure (Recall that
α = 1). This lowers the critical bound of other signals an agent has to obtain to
continue with cooperation.
On the other hand, since β = 0, we have
β̂ = Pr(|C| ≥ K(N − 1)|D) = Pr(|C| ≥ K(N − 1)|D).
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The argument is now that limN→∞ |α̂− β̂| = 0 while the right hand side of (4.13)
tends to infinity as N →∞. To see this, note that
β̂ = 1−
K(N−1)∑
k=1
(
K(N − 1)
k
)
γk(1− γ)K(N−1)−k
and
α̂ = 1−
K(N−1)−1∑
k=1
(
K(N − 1)− 1
k
)
γk(1− γ)K(N−1)−1−k.
Then, α̂− β̂ is given by
K(N−1)∑
k=1
(
K(N − 1)
k
)
γk(1− γ)K(N−1)−k−
K(N−1)−1∑
k=1
(
K(N − 1)− 1
k
)
γk(1− γ)K(N−1)−1−k.
Note that
K(N−1)∑
k=1
(
K(N − 1)
k
)
γk(1− γ)K(N−1)−k =
K(N−1)−1∑
k=1
(
K(N − 1)− 1
k
)
γk(1− γ)K(N−1)−1−k + γK(N−1).
Hence, |α̂ − β̂| = γK(N−1) and limN→∞ |α̂ − β̂| = 0. So there exists ε > 0 such that
|α̂ − β̂| < ε for all N ≥ N . Moreover, as N → ∞ the right hand side of (4.13), tends
to infinity. This holds since all other expressions in the denominator of the expression
on the right hand side of that equation cannot tend to infinity as well as N → ∞.
Moreover, no expression in the numerator can go to zero as N → ∞. But since the
left hand side of the equation cannot be larger than ε, there exists N such that for all
N ≥ N equation (4.13) does not hold.
It is straightforward to extend the Proposition for any α ∈ (0, 1) and any β ∈
(0, 1), α > β.
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If there is a cost for network formation, the network would not form if N ≥ N !
The finding also suggests why in many communities we do not observe decentralized
cooperation networks. If the number of community members gets large, other institu-
tions such as courts might be needed (see Milgrom, North and Weingast [41]). Courts
use a huge legal apparatus which does not rely on decentralized communication alone.
4.6 Discussion
I briefly discuss the robustness of these results with respect to assumption (E5). This
assumption prevents contagious punishments. Without this assumption, it is not clear
if agents fulfill their punishment obligations. I shall demonstrate how the qualitative
results of this chapter hold even without assumption (E5).
Consider first the analysis and results of section 4.3, the situation without noise.
The relevant condition is that the payoff from punishing a noncooperator has to be
higher than the payoff from playing C:
0 +
δ
1− δ
[
I −N
I − 1 0 +
Lj + 1
I − 1 0 +
N − Lj − 2
I − 1 a
]
≥ (4.14)
b+
δ
1− δ
[
I −N
I − 1 0 +
1
I − 10 +
N − 2
I − 1 a
]
.
There are two possibilities to satisfy this constraint without making assumption (E5).
First, the payoff b from playing C when my partner plays D can be made small enough
to provide the correct incentives. This is the same requirement as in Kandori [34] who
needs this assumption to make his contagion mechanism work (see section 4.3.1). A
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second possibility would be the incentive constraint for Lj and derive an upper bound
L̂ on the number of contacts. Then, we would have two restrictions on the number of
contacts. First, as shown in section 4.3, the number of contacts has to be high enough
to ensure cooperation:
Lj ≥ L◦ = (N − 1)(1− δ)(c− a)
δa
. (4.15)
Second, the number of contacts has to be less than L̂ to ensure network member’s
participation in a punishment stage of the game. Hence, L◦ < L̂ would have to hold
for such an equilibrium to exist. Suppose that this condition holds and that network
members choose contacts which induce extremal equilibria (assumption (E6)). This
numbers of contacts is then given by L̂. This is also a number which is optimal from
a social point of view. Hence, private and social incentives overline as in section 4.3.
Consider now the model with noise. Recall that network members’ payoffs are
decreasing in the number of contacts their partners have. The number of contacts has
to be high enough to ensure cooperation. On the other hand, punishment has to be
ensured. Again, this can be achieved by making b sufficiently small. Or, the number
of contacts has to be low enough to ensure network members’ participation in the
punishment but high enough to sustain cooperation in the first place. Clearly, since
network members payoffs are decreasing in the number of contacts of their partners,
it is socially optimal to choose the lower number of the two which is just enough to
support cooperation. Private incentives would again go in the other direction and
agents would choose too much contacts in the game of contact formation in stage 0.
In other words: the basic results from section 4.4 continue to hold. This is also valid
for the main result in section 4.5.
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4.7 Conclusion
This paper models a communication network and shows how the optimal number of
contacts in such a network is affected when communication is noisy. If communication
is noisy, it is not optimal to have close contacts to all network members. Moreover, as
the number of network members gets large, cooperation in the network fails. If network
formation is costly, we cannot expect a network to form.
There are many other institutions sustaining cooperation in such situations, for
example courts. It would be interesting to examine under which circumstances we
observe decentralized institutions such as communication networks and under which
circumstances we observe the existence of centralized institutions such as courts. More-
over, when would we expect a mechanism without any institution as the contagion
mechanism proposed by Kandori and Ellison?
Another line of research could focus on communication networks in a setting where
there is additional source of externalities among network members. While in my setting
honest information transmission is always a best response, one can easily imagine a
situation where an agents payoff strictly increases if an other agent gets punished. This
could be the case if there is not only a double-sided moral hazard problem but also if
there is the situation that a network member benefits from another network member
being punished. Suppose, for example, that there is some competitive relation among
some or all network members. Hence, there is a direct incentive to assault another
network member even if that network member did cooperate. The network would then
serve not only as a means to support cooperation but information flow is then also a
means to hurt a potential competitor.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2 (The Proof
of Proposition 2)
I shall prove the Proposition by establishing four Lemmata. I introduce some further
notation. Given an equilibrium in stage two of the game, the correspondence s→ b∗i (·)
will be denoted as φi(·). The vector (φ1(·), ..., φ(·)) will be denoted as φ. Let Φ(s) :=∑
i∈B φi(s).
Lemma 3. (i) In each of the subgames in stage 2, a unique symmetric Nash equi-
librium in pure strategies (b∗1(s), ..., b
∗
B(s)) exists. It is given by
b∗i := b
∗ = f ′(s/B)
s(B − 1)
B2
. (A.1)
(ii) The correspondence Φ(s) is a continuous function in s :=
∑
j∈S sj.
Proof. (i). It is straightforward to show that any Nash equilibrium in stage must be
symmetric, that is b∗1(s) = ... = b
∗
B(s) for all s. To find the Nash equilibrium, I compute
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the first-order condition and use symmetry to find a unique solution
b∗i := b
∗ = f ′(s/B)
s(B − 1)
B2
. (A.2)
for all i. Due to concavity of f this is a maximum indeed.
(ii). This follows immediately from inspection of equation (A.2) and from the
assumption that f is twice continuously differentiable.
Given these results, the problem amounts to show existence of a Nash equilibrium
for the game between the sellers, where now,
pi(sj, s−j) = f (sjp(s)) + 1− sj (A.3)
with
p(s) =
Φ(s)
s
= f ′(s/B)
B − 1
B
, (A.4)
from Lemma 3.
Lemma 4. p′(s) < 0 ∀ s.
Proof. Recall that f ′′ < 0. The result follows then from equation (A.4).
We cannot prove that pi is quasiconcave, let alone be concave in sj for any seller
j. However, note that pi is a continuous function.
Let R be the reaction correspondence of any seller for that game, that is
R : [0, (S − 1)]→ [0, 1] (A.5)
and r := inf R.
Using standard arguments, one can prove
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Lemma 5. The correspondence R satisfies
(i) R is nonempty
(ii) R is closed
Proof. Omitted.
Given these results, I complete the proof with an argument building on Roberts
and Sonnenschein [47] - of which the original idea appeared in McManus ([38] and
[39]). Roberts and Sonnenschein show existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies for the Cournot model with general downward sloping demand functions
and symmetric firms.1 Notice that, from Lemma 4, the ”inverse demand function”
slopes downward as a result of the model! Roberts and Sonnenschein [47] (Lemma, p.
114) prove that a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists, if the best response
correspondences in the game between the sellers are nonempty, closed from the right
and exhibit only upward jumps. They might be sloping downward, though. 2 Since,
from Lemma 5, R is nonempty and closed, existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium
is assured if I can establish that best response correspondences jump only upwards.
The last step shows hence that the function r defined by r = inf R is upper
semicontinuous from the left, that is sn−j → s−j, sn−j < s−j implies lim sup r(sn−j) ≤
r(s−j). As a last piece of notation, let σ =
∑
k∈S\{j} sk. Then, s = σ + sj,
Lemma 6. The function r(s−j) := inf R(s−j) is upper semicontinuous from the left.
1Symmetry refers to the firms’ cost functions.
2I will not state this result formally, but the reader may convince himself by a drawing for the
one-dimensional case when best responses are single-valued.
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Proof. I proceed in three steps.
Step 1. I show that if, for any s−j, sj is such that for all s˜j ≥ sj, I have
pij(sj, s−j) ≥ pij(s˜j, s−j), then this implies r(s−j) ≤ sj. Assume not, that is r(s−j) > sj.
Then pij(sj, s−j) ≥ pij(r(s−j), s−j) would imply sj ∈ R(s−j), a contradiction, since
sj < r(s−j) = inf R(s−j).
Step 2. Assume that sj = r(s−j). Then, for any ŝj such that ŝj ≥ sj, it must
hold that
f (sjp(sj + σ))− sj ≥ f (ŝjp(ŝj + σ))− ŝj. (A.6)
I omit the initial endowment 1 on both sides. Since the function pi is continuous and
since, from Lemma 4, p′ < 0, it also holds that, for any δ > 0,
f ((sj + δ)p(sj + σ))− (sj + δ) ≥ f ((ŝj + δ)p(ŝj + σ))− (ŝj + δ). (A.7)
Rewrite the last inequality as, after proceeding in the same way as for ŝj ≥ sj,”for
any u ≥ (sj + δ),
f ((sj + δ)p((sj + δ) + (σ − δ)))− (sj + δ) ≥ f (up(σ − δ + u))− u.” (A.8)
This reads: sj + δ is better than u against σ − δ. Moreover, u ≥ (sj + δ). I shall
use this information in the last step, step 3, and apply step 1 on these inequalities.
Step 3. Combining step 1 and the last equation in step 2, I get
r(s−j − δ) ≤ sj + δ. (A.9)
Letting δ := s−j − sn−j, this expression is equal to
r(sn−j) ≤ sj + (s−j − sn−j). (A.10)
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Taking lim sup on both sides, I finally get
lim sup
sn−j→s−j
r(sn−j) ≤ sj. (A.11)
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3 (The Proof
of Proposition 6)
I look for prices p(1), p(2), ... that maximise the buyer’s objective function and that
are sustainable as an equilibrium. In this equilibrium, trade always occurs and buyers
never leave their sellers. Moreover, the buyer always rejects any prices higher than the
ones specified by the equilibrium price sequence. If a buyer accepts a higher price the
equilibrium price sequence gets restarted. By this construction I impose the most severe
punishment on a defector. The most severe punishment is the restart of the sequence
since the buyer can always leave the seller and start a new partnership. Hence, any
punishment that the buyer’s trading partner imposes cannot be harsher than a restart
of the equilibrium price sequence and any optimal equilibrium must be supported by
the most severe punishment.
The incentive constraints for the buyers that must be satisfied by any optimal
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equilibrium price sequence {p∗(t)}∞t=1 are given by
∞∑
τ=t+1
(1− p∗(τ))δτ−tb − δb
[ ∞∑
t=1
δt−1b (1− p∗(t))
]
≥ (1− p(t)) (B.1)
for all t and for all p(t).
Equation (B.1) compares, at each point in time, the trade-off between a one-
period gain from a deviation from the prescribed equilibrium, which is 1− p(t), to the
discounted future losses which are given by the left hand side of equation (B.1). The
first term on the left hand side is the expected discounted payoff from following the
equilibrium strategy whereas the second term on the left-hand side resembles the restart
from the price sequence {p∗(t)}∞t=1. Incentive compatibility requires that discounted
future losses exceed the one-period deviation gain at each point in time. Let E(t, δb)
be the set of all price sequences that satisfy the incentive constraints.
An optimal price sequence is a solution to problem (P):
(P) max
p(t)∈E(t,δb)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1b (1− p(t)) (B.2)
In words: if I look for a price sequence that maximizes buyers’ expected dis-
counted utility subject to p∗(t) satisfying the incentive constraints for all t, I must end
up with {p∗(t)}∞t=1 itself. Since {p∗(t)}∞t=1 depends on δb, I denote buyers’ utility from
an optimal equilibrium sequence as U∗(p∗(t)) ≡ U∗.
Suppose, I wish to implement a price sequence with p∗(1) > 0, p∗(2) = p∗(3) =
... = 0. Then, in equilibrium, the following incentive constraints have to be satisfied
for the buyers after each proposal from a seller.
I have, for t = 1,
0 +
δb
1− δb ≥ (1− p(t)) + δbU
∗ for all p(t) ≥ p∗(1). (B.3)
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For all t = 2, 3, ...,
0 +
δb
1− δb ≥ (1− p(t)) + δbU
∗ for all p(t) ≥ 0. (B.4)
To satisfy the requirement of sequential rationality within each relationship , I
have to find the incentive constraints which put the hardest restrictions on U∗ for any
given δb. The other constraints will be satisfied as well. It is easy to see that he crucial
constraint is the one from period 2 onwards. Sequential rationality requires that I set
p(1) = p∗(1) and p(t) = 0 for all t = 2, 3, ....
This yields, from equation (B.4),
U∗ ≤
(
2δb − 1
1− δb
)
1
δb
, (B.5)
which I let hold with equality.
I show next that the proposed price sequence is optimal indeed. Let pA(t) denote
any arbitrary price sequence with 0 ≤ pA(t) ≤ 1 for all t. Let UA(pA(t)) be the utility
from an arbitrary sequence and let UA(t) be the continuation utility from period t on
for all t.
Lemma 7.
U∗(p∗(t)) ≥ UA(pA(t))
for all sequences pA(t).
Proof. Suppose that there exists an alternative price sequence {pA(t)}t=1∞ such that
U∗(p∗(t)) < UA(pA(t)) and that pA(t) 6= 0 for at least one t ≥ 2 and pA(1) < p∗(1).
Fix the equilibrium with the sequence {p∗(t)}∞t=1. In particular, choose p∗(1) such
that the incentive constraint for the equilibrium in period 1 holds with equality:
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0 +
δb
1− δb = (1− p
∗(1)) + δbU∗. (B.6)
Suppose that there exists a sequence {pA(t)}∞t=1 with pA(t) 6= 0 for at least one
t ≥ 2 and pA(1) < p∗(1) such that UA(pA(t)) > U∗(p∗(t). For {pA(t)}∞t=1 to be an
equilibrium, I require in period t = 1,
0 + δbU
A(2) ≥ (1− pA(1)) + δbUA. (B.7)
Suppose that this constraint is satisfied. Note that, by assumption, UA > U∗
and pA(1) < p
∗(1). Then, the LHS of (B.7) is < than the LHS of (B.6) and that
the RHS of (B.7) is larger than the RHS of (B.6). But then, given δb, if {p∗(t)}∞t=1 is
an equilibrium, (B.7) cannot hold. This in turn implies that {pA(t)}∞t=1 cannot be an
equilibrium, yielding a contradiction.
The derivation of p∗(1) = 1/δb follows immediately from solving the equation
(1− p∗(1)) + δb
1− δb =
(
2δb − 1
1− δb
)
1
δb
.
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